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INTRODUCTION 
The writing of a thesis on the theory of common stocks 
investment, when the whole world is in a state of violent 
upheaval and abnormal conditions, may appear to be inappro-
priate and untimely, but it is in just such times that 
research and study are able to render their greatest service 
particularly if they are coupled with action which takes 
the study's result into consideration. 
Despite the apparent tendency of a great portion of the 
world toward more and more state planning, Americans in 
particular are still blessed with the opportunity and 
responsibility of keeping billions of dollaTs at work® 
Even though contemporary times and conditions are different 
from several previous decades, the same distinctions between 
somid and hazardous risks and between thorough and careless 
analysis of securities still prevail. 
The purpose of this thesis will be to examine a rela-
tively new theory of common stock investment, "The Depressed 
Industry Theory." 
The Depressed Industry Theory is based on the quotation 
taken from Horace's ~ Poetic.a, tll\fany shall be restored 
that now are fallen and many Shall fall that now are in 
honor.u The theory assumes that there is likely to be a 
big difference bet\'leen "qua.li tyn and "value" as reflected in 
2 .. 
market prices., 98Quality11 is the characteristic attributed 
to a stock which has had a long record of past success: it 
is thought that such a stock has a relatively sound assur-
ance of stable income and adequate marketability.. It is 
assumed also that quality stocks are "growth" stocks.. 1\s 
the term is used in current circles, a ngrowth corn.panyn 
is one of that select group of firms which fell less during 
the years immediately following the 1929 depression and 
recovered to an even higher position by 1937 than it had 
enjoyed before 1929, as defined by Professor Douglas 
Bellemore of Boston University., In addition to these 
aristocratic stocks (most of which are listed in the famous 
Dow-Jones portfolio), there are a few new securities which 
have become prominent since the business cycle of 1937 .. 
'I'hese securities claim the flattering title of u growth" 
because their industries as a whole are expected to expand .. 
Such 111 growth industries11 at the close of lflorld \'lar II 
would have included television, air conditioning, air 
transport, and most branches of chemical manufacturing .. 1 
It is the characteristic of growth which gives to the public 
mind the assurances mentioned above of stable income and 
adequate marketability.. Such 19 quality" stocks are considered 
to be a superior investment despite their usually higher price. 
1.. Graham, Benjamin; Dodd, David L .. , Security Analzsi~, 
Third edition; New York, McGraw Hill Book Coe, Inc .. , 1951 .. 
The nvalue90 of a stock, on the other hand, is based 
not so much on the reputation of the stock as it is upon 
the financial condition of the firmo History and market 
performance are not ignored in determining the "value" of 
a stock; but the fact that a stock has fallen from 10 qualityn 
does not--at least in the eyes of those who appraise stocks 
in this manner--necessarily destroy valueo If a firm has 
demonstrated strong earning power in the past and presents 
both a healthy balance sheet and commendable qualitative 
factors, ioeo, good management, strong position in its 
industry, etco, it is likely that its stock will be of 
some valueo 
No\'1 if the stock is considered to enjoy "quality" its 
price may well equal or even exceed its actual valueo The 
public tends to believe that if one purchases uquality'J 
price is more or less immaterialo Thus the average investor 
tends to over-price the "quality11 stocks, making them the 
leaders of the marketo But if an industry experiences a 
state of depression which does not extend throughout the 
market, it appears to lose its quality and falls from the 
public graceo In such an event, the market price of the 
"depressed industry" stock will probably u..11.derstate the 
stockts actual valueo The goal of the Depressed Industry 
theorist is to purchase those stocks which have declined 
very considerably in priceo To the general public the 
4 .. 
depressed stocks do not represent 18 quality11 or even 
speculative appeal.. But to the exponents of the Depressed 
Industry Theory, this condition gives investors the 
opportunity to purchase at low prices stocks of good 
companies in temporarily depressed industries .. 
The purpose of this paper," then, is to test this 
Depressed Industry Theory by hindsight, to see how the 
investor would have fared if he had followed it for the last 
two decades .. 
To prove or disprove the value of this theory, three 
stocks from the so-called "Blue-Chips" segment of the stock 
market will be chosen from the 1936-1937 ttmarket leaders" 
which were at that time presumed to have long-term growth 
qualities by the general investing public.. The term "Blue-
Chips", a phrase appropriately borrowed from the poker or 
roulette table, refers here to the distinguished group of 
quality grade common stocks .. 2 
From the same period, three stocks will be chosen from 
firms which for one reason or another have had plateau or 
even declining profits for a period of time, and therefore can 
be classified in the depressed group.. This condition will 
have resulted in their stocks becoming so unpopular with 
the market that they are selling belmv their apparent value .. 
2.. Ibid .. , 37 .. 
These latter stocks will of course be chosen, as was 
mentioned before, from companies which have strong financial 
positions and which have demonstrated strong earning power 
in the past, but for one reason or another are not popular 
with the public. In addition to these requirements, there 
must be reason to believe that their unpopularity is of a 
temporary nature, and that eventually they will rise to a 
more satisfactory position in the stock market. 
These two groups will then be compared from the 1937 
bear market, to the 1946 bull market. Then from the bull 
market of 1946 to the end of 1952, the comparison of the 
two original groups will be discontinued and two new but 
similar groups will be compared. 
From these comparisons, it should be possible to 
derive conclusive evidence to support one or the other of 
these two opposing dicta: t~Make sure of the right quality 
and the price will take care of itselr,n or 11Make sure of 
the right price and the quality '\vill take care of itself .u3 
3e Ibide' 72., 
CHAPTER I 
Before plunging into the intricacies of the contem-
porary stock market and its array of investment theories, it 
will be beneficial to note the numerous attitudes of investors 
during the past half century toward common stocks as 
investment media, and how these historical attitudes have 
evolved into our present investment principles. Such a 
historical survey will attempt to provide the proper back-
ground and introduction for the more detailed study of the 
present investment theories. 
During the period before World War I, experienced 
investors were well aware of the distinctions which lay 
between the investment-grade and speculative common stocks. 
An investment stock was and is one which, upon analysis, 
promises safety of principal and a satisfactory return. 
Stocks not meeting these requirements are speculative.4 In 
order for a common stock to maintain and possess this divi-
dend stability, such things as stability of earnings, sound 
financial plans, and abundant working capital were pre-
requisites, taken for granted. 
The strong companies in the railroad field provided 
most of the well-known investment-grade common stocks, while 
some unlisted issues of bank and insurance stocks tempted 
wealthy men to buy, because these particular securities 
showed signs of a steady growth over the years. 
Because of the "'..ratered-stock" prominence in this era, 
investors believed that an issue whose market price was close 
to or exceeding its par value was an investment-grade 
security. 5 This meant that the stocks were backed by a real 
capital investment equal to their stated value, plus any 
accumulated surplus. In contrast, a speculative issue 
might have as its 11 par 11 $100, when it was actually sold 
for a great deal less, and consequently was worth only a 
portion of its "paru value. This was usually reflected it 
its market price, and clearly marked its position as one 
of speculation. 
World War I was a period of change in investment 
thinking toward co1mnon stocks. The decade between 1914 
and 1923 showed a marked improvement in the average position 
of industrial common stocks, while the railroads, if anything, 
showed large reversals. Quite a number of industrial enter-
prises reached what was considered to be investment standing 
during this decade, and from this slow beginning came the 
seeds for the 1929 disaster which is termed by Graham and 
Dodd in their book, Securitx: Analysis, the "classic example 
of mass speculation developing into mass mania, with catas-
trophic consequences extending far beyond the financial 
8 .. 
community .. " 
The rise of this king of all bull markets was slow in 
its early years of 1923 and 1924, and was thought by most 
security analysts and investors to be insignificantly 
different from other preceding bull markets.. This assump-
tion obtained more credence when the 1926 recession set in, 
and seasoned investors sat back to ride out the usual bear 
market sequel.. But then one of the first significantly 
different variables of this cycle came to the fore when 
stock prices resumed their upward trend to the heights of 
1929 where they fell to the depths of the early '30's 
depression .. 
The United States had undergone business recessions 
and panics of varying degrees before, but several extreme 
developments set this long-remembered crash apart from all 
others which preceded it.. One reason for this was the use 
of bank credit for marginal trading.. Under this practice, 
a security buyer could purchase a $100 stock by putting 
down $10 of his o'~ money and borrowing the remaining $90 
from ~e bank.. The optimistic reasoning behind this prac-
tice was, using the same example, if the stock went up 10 
points, the gain on capital would be lOo%! Of course, if 
the stock went do~m 10 points, lOQ% of the capital would be 
lost, and the investor would be called upon to put up more 
money, but in the late ~20 1 s, few people even considered 
such a possibility, since "good times were here to stay,." 
Investors were actually urged by their brokers to take 
advantage of ~is easy way to make money, when the security 
buyer more often than not had little ability to cover his 
position, if the time ever came when he would be called upon 
to do so,.6 Another factor causing the phenomenal rise of 
the market was the unscrupulousness and corruption displayed 
by some of the market manipulators,. These manipulators 
would hold meetings daily in their offices to instruct their 
brokers on what was to be sold the following day,.7 It is 
said that security speculation grew up to such a feverish 
pitch that even the elevator boys on Wall Street could give 
a friendly rider a "red-hot tip" on what \..ras likely to go up 
on the stock market the next day .. 8 Other factors adding 
to the depths of the crash were the unusual financial 
structures of the holding companies and investment trusts 
which were participating in this bull market,. As is pointed 
out by Graham and Dodd in Securi tx ... malysis, 91Nearly all the 
holding-company structures had at their base a group of 
sound and growing operating utilities,. But above them were 
reared fantastic pyramids, comprising as many as six 
successive layers of holding companies--each with its own 
complicated capitalization.. These never-ending corporate 
6@ Robb, Dr,. T,. Bruce, Lecture at William Jewell College, 19'2" 
7@ Graham and Dodd, op. c~t .. , 387 
8. Robb, op. cit, 
10 .. 
developments added continuous fuel to the speculation of 
\"'all Street .. " 
More important to the immediate question of common 
stock investments, however, are the theories which Wall 
Streetts investors held during this epoch in contrast to 
their pre-\..rar theories.. For from these 11new-era11 theories 
have come the bases for today's average investor's common 
stock investment theories.. Oddly enough, Wall Street 
investors have never been known to adhere religiously to 
many theories on stock buying, nor do extensive studies 
and economic research in finance make a great impression on 
this group.. The largest percentage of investors take almost 
no economic principles into consideration when they buy 
securities, and in general, the stock market procedes for 
them by a kind of sixth sense intuition.9 All of the 
earlier bull markets had had only speculation as their cause, 
but as in many other respects the 1929 market differed here, 
too, from the rest, in that it even claimed to follow 
certain investment principles, and it generally succeeded 
in entwining the speculative and investment viewpoints into 
such a puzzle that it has yet to be solved successfully,. 
Edgar Lawrence Smith, in a book entitled Common §Jlocks 
~ ~QD£ ~ lB!estments which was published in 1924, 
9.. Graham and Dodd, ~ ... ~i~ .. , 388. 
11 .. 
showed a study of stocks since the Civil War. This study 
included the stockst prices and dividend records, and 
according to Smith, the representative common-stock lists 
had constantly out-performed standard bond investments 
over any ten year period.. Here, then, was the great 
transition.. With Smithts glmdng report to give uhistorical 
optimism" as a backing for common stock purchases, the 
investor would no longer have to consider stocks as a form 
of speculation, but could instead, exercise a bit of selec-
tivity in buying them, and then sit back and wait for the 
increasing dividends and eventual price appreciation to 
roll in .. 
The dynamic factor was the growth quality. Investors 
sought to buy into companies which they believed would 
continue to grow indefinitely; conversely, those companies 
which were at a standstill, or worse yet, operating at a 
slight deficit were under this reasoning left strictly alone. 
Basically, there was nothing wrong 'tdth buying a 
security which had had a good background, and promised to 
continue r·ewarding growth. The danger lay in carrying this 
principle too far, which was exactly what happened to men who 
bought investment stocks at speculative prices. With a favor-
able past and a rosy future an optimistic market easily lost 
its sense of values and paid excessive prices for so-called 
growth stocks.. The well-known vicious circle set in here, 
12 .. 
where optimism generated higher prices, and higher prices 
in turn begat optimism. In former cycles, investors wotud 
ride the market up as high as they dared, and then would 
sell out when they believed that their stocks had reached 
dangerous heights in comparison with past records. They 
left only the speculators holding the stocks at the ex:treme 
peak, and thus tended both to keep the rise within reason-
able bounds and to help make the descent more gradual .. 
But again the 1929 debacle differed from the past in that 
investors and speculators could hardly be distinguished from 
each other, except that the former usually paid larger 
margins if not lOQ% cash for the purchases in contrast to 
the speculators' universally thin margins .. 
Both investors and speculators favored the group of 
stocks called the 18 Blue-Chips" 't'lhich included all the old 
favorites at exalted prices., Other stocks--some even of 
speculative character--participated in this unprecedented 
rise and were regarded as 11 qua.lity stocks," which meant 
that they were regarded as investment stocks, though their 
price may have risen to speculative heights.. In summary 
then, the 1929 stock market theory could be stated thusly: 
11Quality stocks were good investments at almost any price.,nlO 
10.. Ibid .. , pp. 37, 4o4. 
13. 
Contrasting this with the pre-war theories, it was obvious 
that the old concepts of adequate earning pm<~er, adequate 
dividend return, sound :financial plan, etc., had been thrown 
overboard :for the title of "quality stocks." 
After October 1s Black Friday in 1929, the market 
swung as far downward as it had swung upward, and by the 
time 1932 rolled around, as many stocks were under-priced 
as had been overpriced in the market's heyday. Pessimism 
set in, and many people believed that the whole idea of 
common stocks as investments was another delusion similar 
to the South Sea Bubble. But again the pendulum swung back 
and by 1936 investors were confident that some of the good 
common stocks had investment quality. Since that time this. 
opinion has prevailed. 
In brief then, the average common-stock investor today 
places pre-eminent emphasis on the company's future or growth 
possibilities. But he also looks at the company's past 
record and the :financial plan as the bases for the future of 
the stock. 
From this we can see, then, that today's typical in-
vestment theory for purchasing common stocks has coma a long 
way from the Pre-World War I era. But when we contrast the 
commonly held contemporary theory that the average investor 
wants to buy a well-established company which has a long 
dividend record and a generally upward trend of earnings in 
the past, we can still see the great influence of the 
roaring '20's, for it is thought even yet that the nQuality 
Stocks" are the stocks to buy though their prices may be 
vastly overstated in terms of their wortho 
CHAPTER II 
The closing statements of the last chapter indicated 
that the prevailing attitude at present toward the choosing 
of commonstocks for investment seeks to combine a good past 
record with superior future prospects. But seeking and 
finding in the stock market is not necessarily automatic 
and there are any number of approaches for picking the right 
common stock. However, authors of text-books for investment 
courses generally agree that there are three well-known 
ways to choose stocks. Dm..rrie and Fuller say, "Three possible 
sound approaches"; Von Mering says, 18 Three recognized ap-
proachesn; Graham and Dodd say, '6Three Basic Methodsu. From 
this last source we find that these are: 
1. 
2 .. 
The cross-section approach 
The anticipation approach 
a) Short term selectivity 
b) Growth stock selection 
Margin of safety approach 
a) Buying low, selling high 
b) Bargain-issue or appraisal technique 
Taking these up in the order mentioned above, we see that 
the cross-section approach subordinates selectivity to 
diversification. \·Jhen an investor puts his mcney- in stocks 
in accordance with this theory, he is trying to make sure 
that his money will do as well as the major American business 
unitse This investor purchases only the primary issues or 
market leaders. These stocks may even be chosen directly 
16 .. 
from the 30 components of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
though it is an unusual case to find a portfolio which con-
tains exactly those well-known stocks .. 11 The reason for this 
is that everyone who buys stocks is hopeful of beating the 
Dow-Jones list by adding to it a little more selectivity,. 
But according to Graham and Dodd's "Security Analysis, 11 
~ ....... when the large institutional holdings are scrutinized 
with an appraising eye, it will be noted that selectivity 
really plays a minor role as compared with the controlling 
objective of wide diversification among major units in most 
of the leading industries.,n 
In dealing with the second approach, the anticipation 
approach, we find the dominant element in common-stock 
analysis by security selling firms., Here the investor will 
find volumes of analytical effort and intensive studies to 
help him choose the proper common stocks., An earnest 
investor may spend weeks in a business library pouring over 
t~Moody's", "Standard and Poore's", 11 The Moodyts Loose-Leaf 
Service," or Barron 1 s (to mention a few) trying to determine 
the best industry for investment. The information ~~itten 
in these publications sounds as authoritative as possible 
while every publisher inconspicuously inserts that nothing 
in the publication is guaranteed for anyting., Furthermore, 
the aforementioned erstwhile investor may be quite discon-
certed to find that the opinions of the "authorities" vacillate 
from week to week. Luckily for the publishers, the general 
public has a notoriously bad memory. The greatest portion of 
recommendations from Wall Street concerning the purchase of 
common stocks are based on short-term anticipations, i.e., the 
stocks which have the best outlook for the next six months 
or year. Wall Street firms have a logically sounding 
argument for depending so much on these short-term recom-
mendations, because no really accurate forecast of business 
can be made any further into the future than one year, if 
one can be made for that far. Even so, it is easy to see how 
undue emphasis or trust can be placed on these short-term 
nstudies," for in buying a stock on the basis of its immediate 
prospects, the price is usually left out of the calculation. 
That price may already have advanced substantially in anti-
cipation of the very improvement that the buyer is counting 
upon. If he is already paying, and perhaps overpaying for 
this improvement, how can he expect to profit from it when 
it comes?12 
Looking at the anticipation approach from another angle, 
we come to the growth-stock approach. The tenents of this 
investment approach were included in the National Investors 
Corporation report of 1938 which says, to The studies by this 
organization directed specifically toward improved procedure 
in selection, afford evidence that the common stocks of 
-
12. Ibid., 397. 
18 .. 
growth companies--that is companies whose earnings move 
forward from cycle to cycle, and are only temporarily inter-
rupted by periodic business depressions--offer the most ef-
fective medium of investment in the field of common stocks, 
either in terms of dividend return or longer term capital 
appreciation., We believe that this general conclusion can 
be demonstrated statistically and is supported by economic 
analysis and practical reasoning.," 
In viewing this theory from an utopian stand-point~ 
one would have to admit that an investor who successfully 
chose growth stocks, when their shares were at bargain 
prices and held on to them, undoubtedly would do tremen-
dously well with his investment appreciation., However, what 
are the chances for all careful security analysts following 
this policy successfully? Or to put it another way, can 
growth stocks be identified in their infancy with reason-
able accuracy? And, if they can be recognized by the general 
public, what is to stop every investor from buying them, and 
thereby force up the price to a position where the invest-
ment stock is selling at speculative prices? tiJe find the 
same fault in this theory that we found in the former one; 
i.,e.,, generally speaking, when stocks are suspected of having 
growth characteristics, the market immediately discounts this 
in the price, and the unwary investor pays heavily for an 
advantage he hopes will come in the future., Even if he is 
fortunate,.and the stock which he purchased does climb, he 
will likely find that his capital appreciation just covers 
the amount he expended for the stock when he bought it. To 
be successful while using this theory, an investor must 
examine the growth-characteristics of the stock carefully, 
and on the whole, view the future with skepticism. When he 
does decide to purchase stocks, he must exercise the same 
judgment a businessman would, given the same money, to invest 
in a private undertaking over which he had control. 
The last sound approach to the stock market, and the 
one, incidentally, which includes the Depressed Industry 
Theory, operates on the margin-of-safety principle. Under 
this theory the analyst is convinced that the stock is 
worth more than he pays for it, and he has reason to believe 
that the company's future will be brighter. Picking such 
under-valued securities can be done either of two ways. 
At times when the general market is low, such as it was in 
1932, al~ost every security is undervalued. At other more 
normal times, the method to follow is to discover individual 
common stocks which apparently are selling in a depressed 
market. In either case, the investorws margin-of safety is 
the difference between the stock's assumed intrinsic worth 
and the amount it is selling for. 
Now obviously the choosing of undervalued securities 
during a bear market wotud be comparatively simple to the 
20., 
tasl1: of choosing them \vhen the market is more neutral., Dur-
ing such a time of a neighborhood of normalcy it is an al-
most unheard-of phenomena to find a market leader selling at 
under-valued prices., Therefore, ·the field of undervalued 
stocks would be confined almost completely to some of the 
secondary, that is, less \vell-known col!h'Tion stocks., 'I'o fit 
their depressed state (as well as the Depressed Industry 
Theory) their price will lndoubtedly be low from a quanti-
tative angle., However, these secondary stockst outlook for 
the future will be no better than average., The stocks for 
an investor who is following the Deprepsed Industry Theory 
should come from enterprises 't'lhich are long established, well 
financed, important in their industries, and presumably 
destined to stay in business and make profits indefinitely 
in the future, but lacking in ::;peculative or grm-1th appeal., 
Though this last mentioned theory of investment is by 
no means believed b y the majority of experienced investors 
or practicing security analysts to be the method of obtaining 
real opportunities in common stocks, the remainder of this 
thesis \~Till be dedicated to the proving or disproving of the 
assumption that investors who follow the Depressed Industry 
Theory lflill gain greater appreciation on their capital than 
will other investors who follow the mass-recommendations and 
market leaders supplied by Wall Street., 
21 .. 
CHAPTER III 
To discover the three most favored stocks of 1936-1937, 
i .. e .. , the stocks which were most highly recommended by the 
various security publications and thus subsequently bought 
by the general public, lrle can turn to "The Ivlagazine of Wall 
Street" and "Barrons11 where they presented to their readers 
lists of the industries which they believed would be most 
profitable for potential investors to put their money into .. 
These lists are remarkably similar as can be noted by 
the comparisons given below .. 
uThe Magazine of 1tlall Street" printed early in 1937 the 
following list of industries 11 most favored for price appreci-
ation:" 
1.. Farm Machinery 
2.. Mail Order Houses 
3.. Steels 
~- Non-ferrous Metals 
5., Chemicals 
6.. Motion Pictures 
7., Liquors 
8.. Air Craft Manufacturers 
9. Paint 
Later in 1937 (December 4, 1937) t~Barron'sn listed 
these five market leaders: 
1., Agricultural Implements 
2.. Aviation Manufacturers 
3. Chemicals 
4.. Non-ferrous Metals 
5. Steels 
22., 
On November 11, 1936, John De C., Weldon, writing for 
11 The l'1agazine of \!fall Street 11 said the follo1r1ing industries 
\'iere the best buys for 1937: nHeavy steels, non-ferrous 
metals, electrical equipment, railroad equipment, chemicals, 
petroleum, construction, farm equipment and aviation manu-
facturers. n Other lists \'/ere published by ttBa.rrons•• and 
"The !\fagazine of Wall Streett~ throughout this period of 1936 
and 1937, but the lists differed only slightly from those 
mentioned above. 
Both "1rhe Magazine of \vall Street" and uBarronsn 
stated the following reasons for having chosen the afore-
mentioned industries as the best industries for future 
investors., 11 These industries (listed above) 'lllill be 
especially benefited by extensive homebuilding, the arma-
ment program, inflation possibilities, general business im-
provement, earning power and further expansion." 
To this list of generalities nThe 1'4agazine of 'itlall 
Street adds, uv •••• benefits from mass purchasing powers.n 
Going from the general to the specific, let's note 
what particular company's stocks within the recommended 
industries were recommended to potential investors as the 
nbest buys. 11 
In order to obtain a representative statement of these 
stock market leaders which is as free from bias as possible 
the following sources have been tapped for information: 
"Barron' sn , ux,foody 's Stock Survey, 11 "Standard & Poor ' s Stock 
Ratings" and 11 The I:'fagazine of \vall Street .. u 
From each of these above-mentioned sources have come 
many recommendations for buying stocks during the latter 
part of 1936 and the early part of 1937.. None of these stock 
listings are identical, of course, but in general, they are 
amazingly similar .. 
To choose the most popular three stocks from all the 
stocks listed then becomes a matter of choosing the three 
stocks which appear on the various lists more often than any 
other recommended stocks .. 
After a close examination of the industries• list 
already presented, it is notable that the following indus-
tries appeared on every list : Agricultural Implements, 
Aviation Manufacturers, Chemicals, Non-ferrous Metals, and 
Steels .. 
It is to be expected, then, that the most popular and 
most highly recommended common stocks will be from companies 
who are in those five industries already listed .. 
John D .. C. Weldon, whose industry listing has already 
been shown in an earlier part of this chapter lists these 
common stocks as 1937 1 s best buys: u.s. Steel, Bethlehem 
Steel, General Electric, Westinghouse, Pullman, American 
Steel Foundry, DuPont, Union Carbide, Air Reduction, Dow 
Chemical, Amerada, Barndall, Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
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Pure Oil, National Gypsum, United States Gypsum, Foster 
t~eeler, Chicago Pneumatic Tool, Ingersoll Rand, Anaconda, 
International Nickel, Deere, International Harvester, Keru~e­
cott, Republic Steels, Climax Molybdenum, Douglas Air, Sperry 
Corporation, United Air Craft Manufacturing, and Curtiss 
Aviation., 
In listing the 10 stocks most favored for price appre-
ciation in October 23, 1937, "The r.fagazine of Wall Streetu 
listed the foll01.dng firms' common stocks: Sher1.dn Williams, 
General Electric, International Harvester, Bethlehem Steel, 
Boeing Airplane Company, Union Carbide and Carbon, t4inneap-
olis Honeywell, Food r~chinery, Caterpillar Tractor and 
International Nickel Company .. 
All lists recommended stocks which were published 
~uring the latter part of 1936, all through 1937, and for the 
first month of 1938, included many securities from firms 
within the five industries already mentioned--steels, non-
ferrous metals, aviation manufacturing, agricultural 
machinery and chemicals .. 
In listing specific common shares which the security 
analysts were advising as the best for 'capital appreciation, 
Bethlehem Steel was listed more times than any one other 
common stock as being a good buy--a popular market leader .. 
Next to Bethlehem Steel in close order were International 
Harvester, International Nickel, Dow Chemical, Union Carbon 
and Carbide, General Electric, Boeing Airplane, etc. Any 
three of these popularly selling stocks can be assumed to be 
a representative selection of the 1937 Blue Chips section to 
be used in comparison with the three chosen depressed stocks 
from depressed firms in depressed industries of 1937. 
Since Bethlehem Steel was cited most often as a leader 
of the stock market, it will be one of our Blue Chips. The 
other two examples of market leaders will be Union Carbide 
and International Nickel--thus, we have three of the five 
leading industries represented in our sample. 
Bethlehem Steel, International Nickel and Union Carbide 
will be compared with three stocks (also chosen from the 1937 
period) which were selling in a depressed stateo 
In contrast to the wealth of material found in security 
publications concerning the popular market leaders, almost 
no material can be found in these publications concerning 
stocks which are depressed. The reason, of course, is 
evident. When the common investor reads of stocks which have 
made tremendous gains and is then advised to buy these 
appreciating stocks, he immediately projects the past trend 
into the future and can easily visualize a stock~s upward 
trend continuing indefinitely. Consequently, the average 
investor buys his so-called growth stock which seems to have 
such an outstanding future. Thus, the Wall Street publica-
tions have attained their goal of influencing someone to buy. 
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On the other hand, if the same publications would write 
articles about stocks which had declined in value, and were 
apparently experiencing some difficulties, the general 
investing public would soon grow tired of what seemed to 
them unrewarding reading., Certainly no one but a gross 
speculator, to them, would even consider buying a stock 
which had declined in value and had made few visible moves 
for the bettera Few sales, then, would be brought about 
by printing such articles, and eventually the publications 
would lose a considerable amount of patronagea 
Consequently, when looking for industries which are in 
a depressed state, one must look closely from page to page 
for articles with heads such as "Air Transport Earnings 
Decline Furthern or "Textile Industry Stocks Continue To 
Declinea" This type of publicity from the Wall Street publi-
cations tends to force the stocks in these industries do~~ 
even furthera 
One other difficulty in trying to choose industries 
which were selling in a depressed state during the 1937 boom 
is that there was almost a complete absence of such stocks 
that come under the definition of depressed industry stocksa 
According to Dr. Douglas H. Bellemare, the near-total 
absence of stocks selling on a depressed basis in the stock 
market is one indication that the market as a whole may be 
too highol3 Certainly this observation was borne out in 
193?o 
In the September, 1937 issue of "The Annals" magazine, 
an article is written on the depressed condition of the 
textile industry@ The article goes into great detail ex-
plaining why the textile industry had suffered during the 
business boom when almost all other industries were reaching 
their high pre-depression levelso The complete reasons for 
choosing the textile industry as one of the depressed indus-
tries will be explained in a later chaptero At this point 
it is sufficient to say that the textile industry was 
depressed in 1937, and that Pepperell, I~go will be the 
firm whose stocks we compare with the already-mentioned 
market leaderso 
Another industry which was backsliding during the 
prosperity boom was the Air Transport industryo Such stocks 
as TWA, Pan American, and United Air Lines were declining 
slowly in value as their earnings declinede Consequently 
for these and subsequent reasons which will be developed 
in the next chapter, Pan American Airline's stock will 
represent the depressed industry of Air Transport in 1937. 
The third stock to complete the depressed industry 
group w~i6h will be compared with the three market leaders 
13. Bellemore, D. H., Classroom lecture at Boston University 
1953. ' 
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already chosen is taken from the cosmetic drug industry.. Dur-
ing the 1930's, the cosmetic drug industry was selling in 
a relatively depressed manner in comparison with the securi-
ties of other industries.. Some of the strongest firms 
within that industry were Coty, Inc .. , American Home Pro-
ducts, Bristol-Myers, and Sterling Drug.. For the repre-
sentative ·company within this cosmetic drug industry, 
Bristol-1{yers will be used .. 
And so, on the popular, market leader side of the 
scales \'le have Bethlehem Steel, Union Carbide & Carbon, 
and International Nickel.. To balance these on the depressed 
industry side of the scales we have Pepperell, Mfg .. , 
Pan American Airlines, and Bristol Myers.. If an investor 
invested the same amount of money in each of these firms 
in 1937, and then held the securities thus purchased until 
1946, how would the aggregate total amount of money received 
by the sale of the market leaders plus their accrued divi-
dends compare with the aggregate total amount of money 
received from the sale of the depressed industry stocks plus 
their accrued dividends? 
To find the answer to this question we must first 
describe adequately each of the six companies and their 
stocks which we have chosen to compare .. 
Since we have repeatedly mentioned the market leader 
stocks first in this paper, and since Bethlehem Steel was the 
most highly recownended stock for purchase in 1937, we 
shall begin our common stock desc riptions with an analysis 
of Bethlehem Steel in 1937. 
To adequately describe any given firm one must first 
give a brief summary of the industry of which the firm is a 
part. "The Hagazine of w·all Street,u nThe \vall Street 
Journal, 11 "Barron ll s, 11 "Standard 1 s Ratings, 11 and "lv!oody's 
Looseleaf Service" all gave a great deal of space in their 
publications to present an analysis of the steel industry. 
Throughout 1937, particularly in the first six months, 
Bethlehem Steel was a favored stock of investment firms 
according to"Barron 1 s." 
The analysis of the steel industry as it appeared to 
the Wall Street Publications in February, June, and September 
will show the reasons why Bethlehem Steel was considered to 
be a great growth stock and market leader. 
In February of 1937, it was obvious that the steel 
industry had started the new year under favorable auspices. 
According to 11 I•1oody 1 s Loose-Leaf Service" the January steel 
ingot production registered a new high record for that month 
for all times. The outlook suggested further gains in steel 
demand, consumption, production and earnings in the first 
half of 1937 and steel stocks were believed to well qualify 
for long range retentione 
Steel ingot production in 1936 recorded an increase of 
40 per cent over the year before on top of a 30 per cent gain 
registered in 1935. Ingot production in 1936 was 13 per 
cent under 1939, whereas 1935 production was 38.5 per cent 
under 1929. 
Greatest 1936 gains were shown in steel used for railroads 
buildings and machinery. The railroad demand for steel was 
better than double that of 1935. Machinery demand gained 
63 per cent and steel for buildings increased by 40 per 
cent. Steel for exports increased by 45 per cent. 
The light steel producers continued to enjoy in 1936 
the rapid growth this branch of the industry had enjoyed 
since the depression low. Black plate for tinning, other 
sheets and strips recorded new all time highs. 
Despite the large 1936 gains sho\~ by heavy steel 
classifications, comparison of 1936 output with 1929 output 
of steel for buildings, railroads and oil, gas and mining 
indicated ample basis for anticipating further gains in 
these classifications, in the minds of the Wall Street 
publications. The various Wall Street authorities anti-
cipated for the year of 1937 a further gain of around 20 
per cent in the consumption of finished steel, plus further 
gains in the demand for the lighter types of steels used 
for automobiles, household, electrical office equipment, 
machine tools and containers. However, the greatest 
relative gains were expected to be in the field of heavy 
steel used for rails, railroad equipment, engineering and 
building operations. 
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The rise in steel wages brought about by labor nego-
tiations in November, 1936, was believed to be offset by the 
rise in prices charged for steel's products. Operations in 
January of 1937 were at the rate of 81.42 per cent of capa-
city, which was the highest rate since February, 1930. 
According to "Moody's Stock Survey for Investors," the 
most satisfactory earnings gains in 1937 were expected to be 
made by those companies with capacity well balanced between 
lighter steels and heavier type steels. Such companies would 
include u. s. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Jones & Laughlin, 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and Inland Steel. 
With the apparent rosy future which was just ahead for 
the big steel companies, it lias not hard for the Wall Street 
publications to translate probable gains in steel activity 
into substantially increased profits for the producers over 
the years ahead .. 
To give the reader some financial background on four 
of the biggest steel producers in this country during the 
years of 1936 and 1937, these comparative statistics taken 
from Standard & Poor's of 1937 are presented: 
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COMPARATIVE STATISTICS--STEEL STOCKS 
Funded Pfd Com Working 1936-1937 An .. 
~H•Debt *Shs ~t-stoc~ Cap! tal Prine-Range Div. Yield 
Bethlehem 130 112 3194 24.62 91-45 1.50 1 .. 63 
J & L 35 58 576 112.70 119-30 0 0 
u .. s .. 93 360 8703 44 .. 97 109-46 9 0 
Youngstown 78 15 1384 41.53 87-41 0 0 
~~(000,000 omitted) 
<Sio (000 omitted) 
The annual earnings per common share for the four com-
panies described above were as follows: (Source: Standard & 
Poor's) 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Beth .. 11 .. 02 5 .. 26 2.,21 8 .. 11 4 .. 77 1 .. 87 0 .. 70 2.00 
J&L 29 .. 04 8 .. 64 11.09 20 .. 86 14 .. 89 11 .. 91 7 .. 82 .. 10 
u .. s. 21 .. 19 9 .. 12 1 .. 39 11 .. 08 7 .. 09 5 .. 39 2 .. 77 2.90 
Yngst .. 17.28 5 .. 17 6 .. 55 11e75 7 .. 64 2 .. 91 0.64 7 .. 00 
From the February predictions made by Wall Street, we 
have already seen that the expectations were high for a big 
steel year.. But by early June, the steel industry's prospects 
looked even more appealing.. The Wall Street publica tiona torere 
jubilant and said, "The steel industry has come a long way in 
the swing from 1pauper to prince.• Ingot production for 1936 
was within 15 per cent of the 1929 output, and thus far 1937's 
production has registered a 46 per cent gain over the com-
parable period of 1936. For some three months operations were 
:maintained around the 90 per cent level,." 
The long range outlook for the industry did appear 
favorable ,to Wall Street and its investors., Substantial 
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earning gains over 1936 were practically certain and there 
was even a good probability that 1937 output would surpass 
that of 1929. The industry did face the uncertainty of labor 
disputes and their spread and prospects of the usual period of 
summer dullness. However, the Wall Street publications be-
lieved that steel shares appeared reasonably valued on the 
basis of probable 1937 earnings, and that once bought, they 
qualified for retention on the basis of the longer range out-
look .. 
Another factor in steel's favor was expressed by "Moody's 
Stock Survey" on June 7, 1937, which said, "Although steel is 
among our more mature industries and has enjoyed a long up-
ward secular growth which now seems to be flattening out, the 
longer range outlook of the industry has improved over recent 
years by reason of the much greater diversification of uses 
of steel in post-depression as compared with pre-depression 
years.. The past seven or eight years has witnessed a rapid 
and wide growth of usage of steel and a greatly expanded de-
mand for the lighter types of steel such as sheets, strips and 
tin plate.. In 1936, for example, sheet and strip production 
of over 10 million tons reached an all time high. 
"In other words, the base from. which the steel industry 
draws its order has extensively broadened and in a sense the 
industry promises in the future to be much more dependent upon 
the trend of 'General' business than upon that of heavy con-
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struction as in predepression years .. " 
And so 9 in June of 19379 the steel industry still looked 
rewarding to the security analysts and investors. 
Even as late as September when the business outlook was 
not so bright, steel shares were still strongly advised as good 
buys by the Wall Street publications.. For, as "Moody's pub-
lished on September 13, 1937, "The steel industry was certain 
to enjoy a profitable second half year in 1937 and large in-
creases in 1937 earnings over 1936 were well assured .. " The 
outlook beyond 1937, however, was less assured. It was ob-
vious that a recession in general business activity would fall 
with full force upon the steel industry since producers' goods 
industries always seem to suffer first and most violently, 
and a rate of operations in the first half of 1938 below that 
experienced in the first half of 1937 appeared more likely 
than not., 
It became increasingly difficult for Wall Street pub-
lications to visualize important further gains in steel during 
the early months of 1938., Uncertainties over the 1938 out-
look were expected to constitute an effective deterrent to 
near term market optimism regarding the steel shares and un-
favorable comparisons with respect to production and earnings 
would have unfavorable effects during the first half of 1938 .. 
However, the group still maintained that the longer view 
of the industry outlook suggested ample opportunities for 
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further enlargement of steel profits with continuation of the 
longer recovery cycle. On a long term basis share of the 
heavier steel companies such as u.s. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, 
and Youngstol~ Steel, and also those of such light steel 
manufacturers as Inland and National Steel; still possessed 
in the Wall Streeters' opinion interesting possibilities for 
future investors, and the stocks were "not devoid of long 
range a ttrac ti on." 
Having summarized the Wall Street opinions of 1937 con-
cerning the steel industry, let us look briefly at the Beth-
lehem Steel Common Stock itself. As was already p@inted out, 
nearly every broker connected with Wall Street was strongly 
advising Bethlehem Steel Common S.tocks. The June 14, 1937 
issue of "Moody's Loose-Leaf Service" contains a brief su.mmary 
of why Bethlehem Steel Common Stock was considered so attrac-
tive at that time. 
nBethlehem Steel Corporation has participated fully in 
the great revival of steel activity over recent months. Total 
income of $14,000,000 reported for the first quarter of 1937 
was ~tter than double the $6,200,000 reported for the first 
three months of 1936. Earnings per common share of $2.01 for 
the initial 1937 quarter nearly equalled full year 1936 
earnings of $2.09 per share. 
ttoperations in May were at 98 per cent of capacity as 
compared with an average of 87.1 per cent for the first three 
months of 1936 and 75 per cent for the final quarter of 1936. 
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The ratio of production to capacity (rate of operation) by 
quarters for recent years was as follows:" (Only average is 
included) 
1936 
64% 
1935 
39% 
1934 
34% 
1933 
28% 
1932 
16% 
1931 
38% 
1930 
61% 
1929 
91% 
In 1937 (as now) Bethlehem Steel Corporationwas the 
second largest steel producer in the country with total capa-
city about one-third that of u.s. Steel Corporation. Opera-
tions and earnings over a period of years had shown the wide 
fluctuations characteristic or the industry, but the 1937 
management of Bethlehem Steel was believed to have made good 
progress in improving the competitive position of the company 
as well as the status of the common shares. 
Total capacity doubled in the ten years prior to 1932 
for Bethlehem Steel, and in the years after 1932 the light 
steel capacity of the company expanded. Approximately 
$78,000,000 was spent for additions to property in 1934, 1935, 
and in 1936, according to "Standard & Poor's" 1937 edition .. 
Bethlehem Steel was believed to have followed the steel 
industry•s example of wider diversification. The expansion 
program of 1934, 1935 and 1936 resulted in much greater diver-
sification of the company's products. In the years before 
1932 the company had been heavily concentrated in the manu-
facture of structural and other heavy types of steel, but by 
the end of 1936, the company had a substantial capacity for 
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the manufacture of the lighter types of steel such as sheet-
strip and tinplate. Improvements in methods and technology 
had resulted in a large demand for light steels in recent 
years and this type of business was expected to be of a more 
stable nature than the business which came from the manufs.c-
ture of heavy and structural steel, which was then (as now) 
subject to wide variations during the various phases of a 
business cycle .. 
The company also showed financial progress over a period 
of years leading up to 1937, according to "Moody's." Fixed 
charges in 1936 were $6,500,000 whichwaa approximately half 
the $13,000,000 of fixed charges paid in 1925e Early in 1936 
the company merged the parent organization with four wholly 
owned subsidiary properties. This consolidation was expected 
to result in effecting considerable savings in taxes. 
Another gain in Bethlehem's financial structure were 
the preferred dividend accumulations which were discharged in 
1936 by issuance of a new $1 preferred stock. Common stock 
dividends were resumed in December, 1936, with a payment of 
$1.50 per share, shown previously in the table presented above. 
No dividends ~Ad been paid since February, 1932. 
Bethlehem' Steel's Capitalization of 1937 stood as 
follows: 3,191,614 shares of common stock preceded by 933,887 
shares of 5 per cent cumulative preferred stock (par $20--
dividend $1), 933,887 shares of 7 per cent preferred stock 
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(par $100) and $141,093,043 funded debt. Working capital at 
the end of 1936 amounted to $105,019,000 as compared with 
$82,352,000 at the end of 1935. 
In 1936 Bethlehem's production witnessed a 61% increase 
over that of the previous year as compared with a 40 per cent 
gain for the industry as a whole. The net income of the com-
pany was $13,901,000 whichwas to the 'Wall Street analysts an 
impressive gain over the $4,891,000 reported for 1935 but 
" ••• far short of what the company may be expected to earn 
under anything approaching a return to normal conditions .. " 
With this condensation of facts and opinions concerning 
Bethlehem Steel's Common Stock's investment quality, "Moody's 
Survey of Common Stock" summarizes the stock's position in the 
following manner: "Despite the probability of a later year 
recession in earnings, the stock is believed to offer in-
teresting growth possibilities over the longer recovery 
period. n 
The above opinion which was taken from the June 14, 1937 
issue of "Moody's" was virtually echoed in August by "Moody's" 
when Bethlehem's Stock price had advanced to 98 7/8 as of 
August 9, 1937 .. 
Thus we have substantiated that Bethlehem Steel Common 
Stock was definitely a market leader in 1937. The various 
reasons for this have also been pointed out.. It now remains 
for us to discuss similarly International Nickel and Union 
Carbide and Carbon. 
39 
Since International Nickel is virtually the industry as 
well as the firm we shall discuss only its merits as a firm. 
International Nickel, like Bethlehem Steel and Union 
Carbide and Carbon was recommended as a good buy by Wall Streetrs 
publications from the later part of 1936 through 1937. In 
January, nMoody' s Loose-Leaf Service" counted Interne. tiona.l 
Nickel (as well as Bethlehem Steel and Union Carbide & Carbon) 
as among the firms whose stocks were expected to benefit from 
further industrial recoveryo 
But by May, International Nickel Company's stock was 
receiving much greater praise than that accorded it in January. 
For International Nickel Companl of Canada, Ltd.'s common 
stock ..!!!..! ~ of the few stocks that had gone through its 1929 
high.. The 1937 high price of 59 3/8 compared with the 1929 
high of 58 3/4, and the stock in 1937 represented greatly 
superior intrinsic value, according to "Moody 1 s" the..n in 1929 .. 
Since 1929, millions of dollars had been invested in the 
propertieso Nickel consumption had gone to record high levels, 
and earnings and dividends had increased by 50 per cento 
(Source: "Moody's Loose-Leaf Stock Survey") 
One of the most salient features of the metal nickel 
---- --
which ~ ~ highly lauded Bl Wall Street ~ its extreme 
price stabilitz. Over the boom of the late 20•s through the 
depression of the early 1 30 1 s and up to 193?, the price of the 
metal remained stable at around 35 cents per pound.. The reason 
was, of course, the practical monopoly enjoyed by Inter-
national Nickel, which, in 1936~ transacted 85 per cent of 
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the world trade in the metal, according to "Moody's .. " The 
company was also the world's largest producer of copper, 
poundage production of which was, in fact, larger than that of 
nickel. 
The world wide trend toward increased industrial ac-
tivity in the middle 130's together with the large rearmament 
demand for nonferrous metals, as well as the aggressive ef-
forts of the company to develop new uses for its metals did 
result in a sharp upward trend or production and earnings in 
the middle '30's. 
According to Standard & Poor's, on a per share of com-
mon basis profits in 1936 were $2.39 as compared with $1.66 
in 1935~ $1.14 in 1934, $0.53 in 1933, and a deficit of ~0 .. 14 
in 1932 .. 
Although the stable price of nickel did assure the com-
pany of a favorable margin of profit in this important branch 
of its business, demand for this metal was recognized to 
fluctuate widely from prosperity and depression, and so far 
as the other metals produced by the company were concerned, 
profit margins, as well as volume, were known to fluctuate 
over a wide margin. 
Finances of the company were considered strong by Wall 
Street standardse As of the end of 1936, current assets were 
$79 million. Current liabilities were $15 million~ and 
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working capital was $64 milliona In 1935 the working capital 
was $50 million. Over a period of years the company had 
steadily expanded its property. Gross property was in-
creased in 1936 by $11,647~000; nickel production capacity 
was stepped up to more than 220 million pounds per annum. 
Some capital expenditures were planned for 1937, but capital 
expenditures were expected to be materially less than in the 
years leading up to 1937. The company had no long ter.m debt 
of any kind. There were outstanding $27,627,825 of 7 per cent 
preferred stock and 14,584;025 shares of common stock. 
In evaluating the nickel securities, Wall Street ad-
mitted that the " ••• stock could not be considered outstandingly 
cheap, but it was regarded as offering good value among better 
grade industrial equities. For the years 1934-1936 inclusive 
the stock tended to sell around 22-1/2 times reported annual 
earnings per share. Should this ratio obtain during the cur-
rent year and should, further 1937 earnings increase 50 cents 
per share over those of 1936 (a not unreasonable expectation--
this would be less than the 1936 and 1935 increments) f1ue-
tua tions .!.,!! price around the 65 level lvould not be !!..!! !:!!-
reasonable expectaticm. n 
And sure enough, Nickel was selling at 66 1/4 in August 
of 1937 whereas Wall Street again said9 "The shares are re-
garded as one of the best quality issues offering favorable 
long range prospects in the non-ferrous metal industry .. " 
This statement in and of itself was a boost to Inter-
national Nickel's stock, but when one considers that Wall 
Street considered the non-ferrous metal industry one of the 
five best industries to buy into in 19379 the statement con-
cerning International Nickel's shares as being " ••• regarded as 
one of the best quality issues., •• in the non-ferrous metal in-
dustry" certainly demonstrates that Wall Street put Inter-
national Nickel in a top position in 1937. Earnings of Inter-
national Nickel by years according to Standard & Poor's were 
as shown below: 
1929 1930 1931 
1.47 0.22 0 .. 14 
••••• selling at 59 
1932 1933 1934 
0.53 1.14 1.16 
..... yield, 3 .. 39 
1935 1936 (1st 1937 
quarter) 
2.39 5.58 0.11 
as of May 17, 1937 .. 
The last of our market leaders to be discussed for the 
1937 category is Union Carbide & Carbon. Since this firm is 
within the chemical industry, we shall first examine the status 
of the industry in general and then discuss Union Carbide's 
position in particular. 
Chemical company earnings recorded in the first half of 
1937 showed good gains over 1936. Earnings in 1936 fell some-
what short of surpassing 1929 record levels, but prospects 
were that 1937 would witness new highs for the earnings of 
many companies in the industry. The long range outlook for 
the industry continued favorable; according to Wall Street 
opinion., 
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The chemical industry was considered in 1937 to be much 
more complex than almost any other industry. The reasons for 
this belief were that products were extremely varied, ranging 
from those consumed directly by final consumers such as 
. cellophane, paint, and natural gas, to those used as raw 
materials in other industries, such as coal tar$ dyes, nitric 
acid, caustic soda, and acetylene. Not only were the products 
of the industry complex, but various companies made those 
products in all kinds of combinations. The result was that 
the industry was quite devoid of homogeneity. Each company 
was in a sense an industry of itself. 
Although chemical products were consumed both by the 
public directly and by other industries, chemicals were be-
lieved to resemble consumers' goods far more than they did 
capital goods. Thus, although in some cases the products were 
consumed by heavy industry, they partook of the nature of 
consumers' goods. 
Chemical company shares were thought to combine many of 
the better attributes of consumers' goods and capital goods 
shares. Therefore, the volume of their business was injured 
to a much smaller degree in depressions than in the case of 
heavy industry, and growth of their business during periods of 
recovery was said to proceed much more rapidly than in the case 
of most industries directly serving the public. 
A common characteristic of the companies in the industry 
in 1937 was the persistent trend of long term growth. There 
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were exceptions among companies and products, but by and 
large the industry as a whole was enjoying over a long period 
of years a strong upward trend of volume and earnings. This 
was assumed to continue for the indefinite future. The in-
dustry was praised for continually developing new products 
and new uses of and applications for existing products with 
a resultant ever-widening field of consumption. 
Profits depended largely upon volume and the industry 
was believed to be relatively free from the inventory and 
labor problems which so vitally affected the prosperity of 
many other industries .. 
Chemical company earnings increased 36% over 1936 in 
the initial 1937 quarter. For that period earnings of 15 
chemical companies amounted to $36.2 millions compared with 
$26.6 millions reported for the first three months of 1936, 
according to Standard and Poor's. This increase compares with 
a 54 per cent gain recorded by the earnings of 266 industrials 
for the same tim.e" 
The reason that chemical shares were selling at rela-
tively high ratios of prices to earnings was because of the 
favorable long term growth trend shown by the industry and 
because of the relative stability of earnings according to 
the Wall Street opinion. 
For the 12 months which ended March 31, 1937, chemical 
company earnings increased 26 per cent over the previous 12 
months, but chemical shares failed to advance by a corres-
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pending amount as indicated by the fact that the average ratio 
of price to earnings of 13 chemical company stocks was 19.1 
in March of 1936, as compared with a similarly calculated 
f'lgure of 21.2 for March, 1936, according to "Moody's Loose-
Leaf Stock Survey." 
Having taken a quick view of the chem:i.cal industry as a 
whole, we shall now study Union Carbon & Carbide in respect 
to their standing for investors in 1937, according to Wall 
Street analysis. 
Wall Street summed up its opinion af Union Carbide & 
Carbon in "Moody's" stock service of May 3, 1937 by saying, 
"Although Union Carbide & Carbon is not outstandingly cheap 
at recent prices, this stock is worthy of attention by the 
investor interested primarily in favorable long ter.m prospects 
eorabined with good quality .. " 
In the eyes of Wall Street Union Carbide & Carbon Cor-
poration stock had definitely achieved investment stature. 
"This is indicated," said Moody's.~~ "by the fact that the stock 
now sells twice as high on the basis of earnings and dividends 
as it did in the 1 20's. This has apparently been caused by 
the superior rate of growth shown by the company and because 
of the better-than-average stability of earnings and dividends." 
For some historical background on Union Carbide, we can 
note that for the 8 years 1929-36 Union Carbide sold at 
prices averaging 23.1 times contemporary earnings per share. 
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The annual price-earnings ratios showed surprisingly little 
variation, varying from a 1932 high of 26.4 to a 1934 low of 
19.2. For the seven years 1922-28 the average price-earnings 
ratio was 11.4 less than half that shown for 1936 and 1937. 
The high was in 1928 at 15.5, the low was in 1925 at 9.6. 
Price to dividend ratios show a wider variation between 
years (because of the natural tendency to attempt to maintain 
dividends during periods of low earnings}, but these ratios 
also were higher in 1935 to 1937. For the eight years 1929-
36 the average price to dividend ratio was 31.9; for the 
preceding seven year period 1922-28, the average was 17.6. 
(Source: "Moody's Stock Survey") 
On the basis of market experience in 1935, 1936, and 
1937, Wall Street believed that the stock ln May of 1937 was 
priced below par, according to "Moody's Stock Survey." On 
the basis of 1936 earnings of $4.09 per share and assuming an 
annual dividend of $3.20 per share, the May 1937 earnings 
ratio was 23.5 and the price dividend ratio 30.0. This was 
in line with the eight year averages of 23.1 and 31.9 respec-
tively. 
Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation was among the rela-
tively few industrial enterprises which in 1936 surpassed 1929 
earnings. Earnings before depreciation and other charges were 
$45,889,000, an increase of 28 per cent over the previous year 
and according to ~'Moody v s" moderately above the ~4Lf., 126,000 
reported for 1929. Net income available for dividends in 1936 
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was $36~852,000~ an increase of 35 per cent over the 
$27,254,000 reported for 1935; the comparable 1929 figures 
were $35,427~000. 
The business of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation 
was considered unusually well diversified and the company 
apparently was thought to have more to gain from further 
revival in heavy goods industries than many of the other 
chemical companies. The corporation operated 164 manufactur-
ing plants in the u.s. and Canada and their business was 
divided into four major divisions: 1. Calcium Carbide and 
Gases; 2. Chemical Division; 3. Electric Furnace products; 
4. Carbon group. 
The financial position of the company at the end of 1936 
was strong. Working capital amounted to $72~641,438. Cash 
amounted to $31,192,105. The ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities was about 4 to 1. Expenditures for con-
struction in 1936 amounted to $20 million as compared to 11 
million in 1935. (Source: Standard & Poor 1 s) 
The company had a long record of consistent dividend 
payments. Dividends were paid in every year since the initial 
$1 share dividend paid on 1/2/18. The annual dividend rate 
per share increased steadily into 1930 and 1931~ in which years 
$2.60 per share was paid, but thereafter the dividends de-
clined to $1.05 per share in 1933. Dividend increases in 1933 
through 1936 have been constant and the 1936 $3.20 per share 
rate was the highest in the history of the company. 
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Earnings gained every year since 1932 and progress con-
tinued in the first quarter of 1937.. For ths.t period earnings 
per share of stock amounted to $1.11 as compared with 83 
cents reported for the first three months of 1936. For the 
twelve months ended March 31, 1937, earnings were equal to 
$4 .. 37 per share as compared with $.3 .. 27 per share earned for 
the previous twelve month period. (Source: Moody's) 
With this large a~ount of figures, ratios, and trends--
all pointing toward an opti~istic future for Union Carbide & 
Carbon, Wall Street's opinion concerning Union Carbide's com-
mon stock went something like this: "This stock is not judged 
outstandingly attractive at current prices for shor~ term 
purposes but long range appreciation prospects are favorable. 
The favorable record the company has enjoyed, the better than 
average long term prospects, inherent especially in the ferro-
alloy and synthetic chemical divisions, and tbe further 
earnings benefits expected to accrue to the company with a 
further revival of capital goods activity over the years ahead 
lend the shares interest to the conservative type of investor 
interested in acquiring better grade industrial equities .. n 
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CHAPTER IV 
Now that we have examined our three representative stocks 
from the quality section of the 1937 stock market, let us turn 
to our depressed industry stocks and see what the comparisons 
between these unpopular, depressed stocks are to the quality 
stocks we have already studied. 
As was already pointed out in the previous chapter, 
choosing a depressed stock of 1937 is not as easy as selecting 
the 1937 popular stocks. Write-ups describing the popular 
stocks are found in every financial publication, while de-
pressed stocks get almost no publicity except that which 
could be better termed as notoriety. 
Nevertheless, such sources as the 1937 Magazine £f ~ 
Street, "Moody's Stock Survey," "Standard Trade and Security 
Service," and the September issue of 11 The Annals"--to mention 
a few, give sufficient information concerning the stocks which 
were selling in a aepressed state in 1937. 
Before explaining in detail the reasons for choosir~ the 
three specific industries we are using, it would be well to 
review the requirements of a depressed stock: 
1. The stock must have declined in selling price a 
great deal, and. then leveled off for some time .. 
2. The stock must be in a strong financial position, 
especially a strong working capital position .. 
3~ The firm from which the stock is chosen must be 
situated within an industry which is undergoing 
"unpopularity., n In other words, the trouble must 
be industry-wide, not just in the firm .. 
4 .. The stock must be chosen from the best firms 
within the industry., 
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Keeping this criteria in mind, we are now ready to study 
the three representative depressed stocks of 1937 .. 
From the February 27, 1937 issue of THE BUSINESS INFOR-
MATION SERVICE issued by the Division of Business Review in 
the United States Department of Commerce, we find that the 
textile industry stocks had declined steadily from 1925 until 
1932, where the decline began to level off, a.nd stocks' price 
fluctuations were relatively small. 
From the Federal Reserve Board indexes of January, 1938, 
we find that the textile industry's fall from 1925 to 1932 was 
appreciable. By January of 1938, however, cotton, silk, wool, 
and rayon had reached or surpassed their 1923-25 peaks as far 
as consumption went, according to the Federal Reserve Board 
Indexes, but the security prices were still relatively close 
to the 1932 low level., To the public, a seven year decline in 
an industry was too much of a black mark.. The industr•y was 
dead, as far as the public was concerned. So strongly did the 
public believe this, that one of the foremost Wall Street 
publications--"Moodyt s Industrial Survey," d.iscontinued al-
together any printed comments concerning the industry. It 
was simply "written off the books .. n 
By this time, the reader should be wondering the 
reasons for the textile industry's decline and ensuing un-
popularity. Certainly there were many reasons for one of the 
world's oldest industries to fall from grace into such ill-
repute as the textile industry had fallen in the early '30's, 
and the main reasons for this degeneration will be described 
at this time ., 
According to ''The Textile Industry Survey" of 1937 
(this publication is published monthly, but unless a direct 
quotation is taken from one of the specific issues, it will 
be referred to merely as"The Textile Industry Survey"), the 
primary weakness of the textile industry was its over-capacity. 
There were several factors which brought about this over-
capacity, but the large expansion during World War I was 
probably the most important cause. Unfortunately this swollen 
war market also encouraged the rehabilitation of European tex-
tile mills. By t~e mid-twenties, Europe's great textile cen-
ters were producing great quantities of goods at lower cost 
than knerican mills could produce; consequently, the textile 
industry was saddled with war-time over-expansion, and peace-
time shrunken foreign markets so that prices fell rapidly. 
Another upsetting facto~ in the early post-war period was 
the advent of the automatic loom. Although it was a decided 
improvement for the textile industry, too many of the looms 
were installed relative to consumer demand, which, as has al-
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ready been pointed out, fell appreciably in the early twen-
ties,. According to the January issue of "The Textile Industry 
Survey," there •v-ere 900,000 inactive looms in 1923.. By 1925 
there were 2,900,000, and by 1932, 5,100,000 inactive looms, 
the peak figure,. After that year, the figure declined 
steadily .. 
A fourth depressing factor in part of the textile in-
dustry was the discovery of 11 artificial fibers," all grouped 
at that time under the one heading, '•rayon." Though rayon had 
made relatively little headway in the textile market of 1937, 
by present standards, even then large inroads in the fine 
goods field meant that New England textile firms were ex-
periencing especially trying times,. Rayon had made almost no 
impression on the Southern textile mills, and therefore, a 
textile company which maintained mills both in New England and 
south of the Mason Dixon line was comparatively well off. 
Thus far we have noted only the adverse factors of the 
textile industry, and if adverse factors were all we could 
examine, then the textile industry would not fit our "de-
pressed industry theory .. " However, the industry was realizing 
its own mistakes and pitfalls, and as early as 1927 was at-
tempting to correct the over-capacity.. Wide-scale reduction 
of installed equipment began in 1927. By 1937 cotton spindles 
alone had been reduced 26% from the base year of 1927, ac-
cording to the March issue of "The Textile Industry Survey .. n 
The textile industry faced other depressing factors, not 
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as important as the above~ but which in the aggregate posed a 
definite problem. One of the most difficult was aggravated 
by RFC loans to marginal textile mills~ which only prolonged 
the death throes of many financially weak organizations. The 
loans did not help the weak firms appreciably~ and their ar-
tificially-prolonged existence made it that much harder for 
the stronger firms to stay solvent. 
The industry was also faced with a slow rate of tech-
nological development. Also~ the cost of new installations was 
so high that it became prohibitive to exploit such new methods 
as were devised and which might have reduced costs in the long 
run .. 
In the middle-thirties the trend toward gradual elimi-
nation of excess capacity was continued. However~ the 
elimination period was prolonged, and until capacity more 
nearly fit the consumer demand, the stabilization of operations 
within the industry as a whole was postponed. 
The merchandising practices of the textile industry 
posed still another problem. The industry as a whole had made 
almost no effort to arouse consumer consciousness or to gain 
individuality for its products.. The few exceptional mills will 
be discussed later, but in the main, production was immediately 
sold to middle men called ''selling agents." These ttselling 
agents" were accused of almost every unethical business prac-
tice imaginable--in fact, the March 1934 issue of ~'The Textile 
Industry Survey" stated explicitly that the textile industry 
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was virtually run for the "selling agents." 
The 1937 textile industry was so lacking in integration 
that products, pe.'ssing through many hands, were often tripled 
or even quadrupled in price by the time they reached the con-
sumer. 
The exceptions, concentrated in the cotton goods field, 
made considerable effort to "court the consumer" and to bypass 
the middle man. These integrated units branded their output 
and created a broad consumer market through aggressive national 
advertising. Such integrated companies as Pepperell Manufac-
turing and Cannon Mills were thereby able to secure better 
prices for their merchandise, and their earnings record for 
the period prior to 1937 made a striking contrast to the 
average for the industry. 
The failure of the industry generally to adopt the neces-
sary aggressive merchandising policies and thereby exert 
greater control over prices commanded by its products had con-
tributed to its unfavorable record. It had also tended to 
aggravate the unsound position in which the industry found it-
self as a result of its inability to reduce productive facili-
ties promptly to a level more commensurate with demand. 
The violent fluctuations of textile mill operations had 
had a disquieting effect on the industry as a whole. At first 
consideration, one would expect stable consumer demand to 
govern mill operations, but closer consideration shows that 
under 1937 conditions non-integrated firms had little to look 
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forward to except continuing violent fluctuations due to the 
buying and selling policies followed by all sections of the 
trade. These policies resulted in fluctuations which tended 
toward a definite periodicity of a two year cycle, according 
to "The Textile Industry Survey. 11 
The fluctuations were brought about like this: During 
periods of rising prices, distributors would place orders in 
advance as far as possible. This would cause the mills to 
have an abundance of orders and therefore stimulate the pro-
duction unduly. The mills would produce in excess of actual 
consumptive needs. Eventually the distributors' stockpiles 
would get too high, and the distributors would cancel all 
their advance orders. Then the mills would be stynded, and 
stagnation would occur. Production facilities would stand 
idle, and men would be unemployed. Prices and demand would 
fall simultaneously, and a long period of time would ensue 
before an era of rising prices would occur again to set off 
another round of over-production in the textile industry. 
In 1937, even the people within the textile industry 
admitted that there was no foreseeable major interruption of 
the two year cycle of the industry, since there was no sign that 
the unsound buying and selling policies follolved by a large 
section of the trade would soon be abandoned. Again, let it 
be emphasized that the integrated firms within the textile in-
dustry such as Cannon Mills and Pepperell Manufacturing were 
relatively free of these violent fluctuations, since their 
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buying and selling practices were independent from the tex-
tile industry as a whole. 
The important disturbing factors concerning the textile 
industry have now been discussed, and from this discussion it 
is assQmed that the reader is beginning to grasp the main 
reasons for the textile industry's decline in popularity for 
the investor. However, it is also assu_med that the reader is 
beginning to attain some inkling as to how an investor might 
stand to gain, even if he put money in a depressed industry 
like the 1937 textile industry. Certainly the problems facing 
the t'extile industry in 1937 were grave, and it lr.Tas inevitable 
that the stock market show its disapproving opinion by forcing 
the security prices down from their mid-twenties high. 
Probably 95% of the firms within the textile industry deserved 
to be selling at their 1937 relatively low levels; however, 
there were a few firms within the textile industry which satis-
factorily met the requirements for a depressed industry stock. 
These stocks were strong financially, possessed a good record, 
~nd were relatively free of the industry-wide problems. Yet, 
because they were within the textile industry, those fine com-
panles were valued on a par with the whole industry, and were 
therefore selling for less than their intrinsic worth. 
The industry's domestic demand was relatively stable. 
According to the June, 1937 issue of "The Textile Industry 
Survey, n the demand for yarn and fabrics was only a 30% de-
crease from the high in 1925 to the low of 1932. 
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During the depression, when money was scarce for con-
sumer goods--or anything else--the life of sheeting, toweling 
and apparel was prolonged as long as possible. Nevertheless, 
clothing, especially, is a necessity of life, and this fact 
which makes consumer demand continuous helps to restrict 
cyclical fluctuations. 
By 1937, the population was beginning to grow again in 
the United States and this was one of the most optimistic fac-
tors possible for the textile industry. 
For the cotton field in the textile industry, an added 
advantage was beginning to be felt considerably by the mid-
thirties. There were increasing uses for cotton fabrics in 
t;he industrial field.. Millions of yards of cotton fabric 
were needed to make rubber tires, and industrial belts, and 
cotton products from the textile mill were being used for 
different purposes every day. 
Consequently, expanding uses for textiles in the indus-
trial world as well as a gradual growth of demand from an in-
creasing population promised to continue to offset the longer-
term trend toward the use of smaller volumes of natural fibers 
in clothing. Thus, with demand fluctuating with consumer in-
comes, and assuming that consumer incomes were on an in-
definitely upward trend in 1937, it seemed safe to assume that 
the demand for cotton and other textile products should trend 
upward, rather than downward over the longer term.. This 
assumption, if true, would alter considerably the stock market's 
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evaluation of textile mill securities. 
Taking a closer look at the competition found within the 
textile industry between synthetic and natural fibers, we find 
that in 1937, the synthetics were still relatively in a minor 
class.. According to the July issue of "Textile \llorld," rayon 
in 1921 equalled 1% of the total textile output. In 1937 it 
bad only reached the 7% level. Rayon had made most of its in-
roads on the silk industry and second, the wool industry. 
Both of these sections of the textile industry were faced with 
staggering handicaps. The cotton field, however, was much 
more fortunate in that it had two strong fields to sell its 
production: about one half of the cotton goods produced in 
1937 by u.s .. mills was used for wearing apparel, according 
to the December issue of "The Textile Industry Survey .. " The 
other half of the cotton goods output went for household uses 
and industrial purposes. As mentioned before, industrial uses 
had expanded steadily through the thirties for cotton, and the 
aggressive research and promotional activities peculiar to the 
cotton field of the textile industry promised to add even more 
new uses for cotton to the industrial total.. Even cotton did 
not maintain its 86 to 88% of total textile consumption for the 
early twenties, but it had far greater success in maintaining 
its position than did the woolen division.. Cotton in 1937 
still represented more than 80% of fiber cons~mption for the 
u .. s. 
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As was already pointed out~ the export market £or 
American textiles was quite small. The peak came for exports 
of textile goods in 1921~ according to the "Standard Trade and 
Securities Service" when total textile goods exported amounted 
to 5% of the textile goods produced in this country. By 1937 
~he total export market had shrunk to less than 2% of the total 
textile goods produced here. Two main factors brought this 
smaller market about--the recovery of Europe's mills by the 
mid-twenties, and the spectacular, unexpected rise of Japan as 
a world exporter of textiles. In 1937 even the textile people 
could find no reason to believe that the u.s. mills could ever 
look forward to exporting very much .. 
The textile industry was fortunate in 1937 in the 
respect that production costs were comparatively low. Wages 
constituted 25 to 35% of the manufacturing costs~ according 
to the "Standard Trade and Securities Service" of October, 
1937. There was a rising trend, however; wages had increased 
90% over pre-NRA levels, and yet they were still 20% below the 
average manufacturing wages. There was almost no chance of 
the industry being unionized in 1937, but there was still the 
possibility of the industry having to pay higher wages. 
Material costs varied for the industry, but raw materials 
were the biggest item. The cotton section was a fortunate in 
that they could hedge for their raw materials and consequently 
the cotton section escaped the fluctuations which the wool in-
dustry faced at all times because the raw material prices 
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varied so greatly. 
There was also a regional cost difference for textile 
mills in 1937 which gave the southern mills a cost advantage 
through lower taxes and lower labor costs. Consequently, a 
firm which had mills in both the South and in New England was 
better off with the cost advantage than was a firm whose mills 
were located only in New England. 
Having considered these different variables for the tex-
tile industry, a potential investor would be interested in 
seeing how these variables affected the earnings and dividends 
of the textile industry. 
The earnings and dividends within the textile industry 
are subject to wide fluctuations in production and the in-
fluences of sharp changes in raw material prices. Therefore, 
the earnings are far from stable. Forces operating within the 
textile industry preclude consistently favorable operating 
returns except in the cases of those integrated companies 
which have not only been able to exercise a greater than average 
degree of control over costs, but also have followed aggressive 
merchandising policies in establishing consumer demand for 
their products. 
The investor will be pleased to note that the textile 
industry's dividends are more stable than their earningss 
Dividend distributions naturally depend on the earning power 
of the individual companies in the field, but, on the average 
the dividend record o~ the textile industry shows far greater 
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stability than do earnings. This in part has been the result 
of the lack of large expenditures for augmenting facilities 
or the modernization of plants and equipment. 
"The continued distribution of a generous portion of 
earnings may be expected so long as the present tax laws re-
main in effect. The most satisfactory and stable return, how-
ever, will, as in the past, be received from such units as 
Cannon Mills and Pepperell Manufacturing which are in sound 
positions and have consistently maintained earning power at 
a relatively favorable level..nl4 
In concluding the survey of the textile industry, these 
investment principles must be remembered: 1) The overcapacity 
of the 1937 textile industry and rapid price changes resulted 
in wide variations in primary demand and operations of the 
industry. 2) Such swings not only resulted in violent flue-
tuations in operating results, but with raw material costs 
accounting for the single largest cost f'actor 9 fiber price 
changes resulted in inventory loss or appreciation, and thus, 
intensified variations in earning power. 3) Thus 9 although 
capitalization of textile companies for the most part was con-
servative, per share returns on equity issues fluctuated 
violently in relation to results for the average industrial 
company. 4) Absence of any necessity for large capital expen-
Standard Trade and Securities Service 9 Textile Industry 
Survez, Vol. 14, October, 1937, pp. T-42. 
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ditures during the 1930's had allowed fairly liberal dividend 
policies, and payments were somewhat more stable than earnings. 
5) Textile equities as a class were regarded as a poor invest-
ment by the public of 1937. 6) However, there were certain 
f':trms within the "sick" industry which upon investigation 
could be worthy of investment. 
Now that the industry situation has been studied, 
several facts should be emphasized: First, that the textile 
industry had gone through a long period of decline, and its 
stocks after years of declining leveled off for a number of 
years. Second, the basic troubles for causing the decline in 
the stocks' selling price were industry wide--not just in a 
few firms. Finally, there appeared to be some few firms, 
within the textile industry, which were financially strong and 
worthy of investment consideration. An additional encouraging 
factor for the whole industry was the tendency to begin 
alleviating some of its worst characteristics, such as over-
capacity, poor merchandising practices, etc. 
To elaborate on one of' the encouraging facts of the tex-
tile industry from above--that is, that some firms within the 
textile industry were worthy of investment consideration, let 
us consider one of the two strongest firms which had managed 
to withstand relatively well against the whole industry's 
trials. 
Pepperell Manufacturing Company, as already indicated, 
was one of the two outstanding firms within the textile 
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industry. The textile industry itself had several categories--
wool, rayon, silk and cotton. Cotton had shown itself to be 
the most resilient of the textiles$ and Cannon Mills and 
Pepperell Manufacturing Company were the best firms within 
the best category of the textile industry.. Therefore$ 
Pepperell Manufacturing Company's stock of 1937 can certainly 
be considered as meeting our depressed industry theory's re-
quirement of being a stock from a leading fir.m within a de-
pressed industry. 
Pepperell Manufacturing Company was originally estab-
lished in 1852$ and by 1937 it ranked as one of the largest and 
most successful cotton goods manufacturers, according to the 
1937 edition of Standard and Poor's. This same source tells 
that in 1937 Pepperell Manufs.cturing Company was best known 
for its Lady Pepperell sheets and pillow cases 9 but that the 
company also produced a variety of other cotton and rayon 
fabrics. At that time the management was considered to be 
progressive in that it consistently enlarged the list of 
products for which Pepperell Manufacturing Company products 
might be used, and thus the earnings potential of the Company 
was broadened considerably. 
The company was also fortunate in having mills located 
in both New England and in the South. Mills in New England 
were noted for their fine goods, while the Southern mills had 
much lower costs. Pepperell Manufacturing Company's manage-
ment had made great strides in cres.ting and maintaining a 
public demand for the company's trade-marked merchandise 
through long, aggressive promotional effects. 
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The company was noted not only throughout the textile 
industry but throughout all companies for its success in the 
field of favorable earnings. Pepperell Manufacturing Company 
in 1937 had been established for 85 years, and during that 
time it had an unbroken record of dividends. This is not to 
say that th~ company was not plagued with some fluctuations of 
earnings, but it is meant to point out that Pepperell Manufac-
turing's earning power in general was substantial. 
This great earning power of Pepperell Manufacturing 
Company in 1937 showed no signs of being reduced in the future. 
As has already been pointed out, Pepperell Manufacturing Com-
pany was one of the few firms within the textile industry 
which was integrated and organized so that effective hedging 
could be made against the wide fluctuations in the price of 
raw materie.ls. Consequently, Pepperell Manufacturing Company, 
though experiencing some fluctuations common to the textile 
industry, was relatively free of the violent ups and downs 
which aggravated the rest of the industry. 
Pepperell Manufacturing Company's financial position was 
strong, as is evidenced by the following comparative balance 
15 
sheet for 1929 through 1936 .. 
15. Standard Trade and Securities Service, The Textile 
Industry Survey, Vol. 13, April, 1937, pp. T-51. 
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Years Net Net Net Dividends Average 
End Sales Income Pr Sh Paid Stock Price 
6/30 ---$1,000,000---
1936 39 .. 94 2 .. 10 21.64 16.00 67 
1935 29.64 1 .. 12 11 .. 21 3 .. 00 60 
1934 28 .. 99 d 0.44 d 4 .. 38 6.00 75 
1933 28 .. 61 1.,61 16.08 6.,20 42 
1932 17 .. 75 0 .. 92 9.24 4 .. 50 37 
1931 14 .. 92 d 1.,20 d 12.,00 4.50 35 
1930 17.13 d o .. 58 d 5 .. 81 a.oo 79 
1929 18.,25 0.66 6 .. 23 8.,00 85 
Looking objectively then, at Pepperell Manufacturing 
Company, if we did not consider the industry of which it was a 
part, we would have seen in 1937 a company which was financially 
strong, a company which had a good record of earnings, and an 
even better record of dividends., If we had looked beyond the 
Pepperell balance sheet of 1937 we would have seen a progres-
sive management, which had spent great time in creating a de-
mand for its products, and we would have seen a company which 
was situated in the two sections of the country where milling 
was best, and therefore, the company derived the advantages 
from both sections. 
Placing Pepperell Manufacturing Company within the con-
fines of the industry would have made it look even better in 
1937, because the company's superior earnings, practical buying 
and selling methods, and integration would have stood out in 
sharp contrast to the firms of the rest of the industry .. 
Therefore, in 1937, we may assume that Pepperell Manu-
facturing Company's stock was selli11g in a depressed condition 
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because it was classified by the buying public with the whole 
textile industry. Since the textile industry 1 s securities were 
speculative as a whole, the general investors classified 
Pepperell Manufacturing Company's stock with the rest of the 
textile industry, and therefore, pushed the stock's selling 
price down with the rest of the industry's securities, even 
though the stock was virtually free of the industry-wide prob-
lems. 
In such a situation, a depressed industry theorist would 
feel that Pepperell Manufacturing Company's stock in 1937 
represented a good investment. And by good investment, we 
meen that a depressed industry theorist would feel that 
Pepperell Manufacturing Company's stock was an even better buy 
than Wall Street's glorified Bethlehem Steel, International 
Nickel Company, Union Carbide and Carbon, or any of the other 
so called "growth, popular stocks." 
Having concluded an examination of Pepperell Manufac-
turing Company's position in 1937 as a depressed industry, let 
us now turn to our second example of an industry which was 
relatively depressed in 1937 -- the medicine drug industry. 
To understand the adverse conditions of the medicine 
drug industry in 1937, the industry must be adequately described. 
Consequently, we shall briefly describe the industry with re-
gard to sales, merchandising policies, competition, distribu-
tion problems, price stabilization policies, and drug legis-
lation which was pending in 1937. These conditions explain why 
67 
the medicine drug industry was considered in 1937 by Wall 
Street as a poor investment for potential investors. Con-
cerning the medicine drug industry, nMoody's Loose-Leaf Ser-
vice" on August 31, 1937, said, " .. .,.the industry lacks in-
teresting growth prospects which militates against price ap-
preciation. Accordingly, investors ..... are advised to withdraw 
their interest from the shares ...... n Moody's sweeping summary 
quickly put Wall Street's opinion of the 1937 medicine drug 
industry, for the other publications shared the same opinion, 
though the opinions were couched in different terms.. Said 
"Standard & Poor's Standard Trade and Securities,t1 na trend 
of increased sales and declining profit margins has been 
characteristic of the industry in the past several years. 
The stocks lack important attraction from an appreciation 
standpoint due to uncertain industry prospects .. 11 On August 
31, 1937, Moody's Industrial Survey discontinued printing any 
comments concerning the medicine drug industry, after first 
advising its readers to sell the shares they owned in the 
medicine drug industry. 
With this obvious distaste of Wall Street publications 
for the medicine drug industry, let us now try to see what 
caused this particular industry's unpopularity .. 
In noting the sales for the industry as a whole, we can 
see that the demand would be quite inelastic.. The demand is 
governed by public health factors, not by the condition of the 
consumers' economic status. Therefore, whether the economy as 
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a whole was suffering from inflation or depression, the 
medicine drug industry could be fairly certain of relatively 
stable drug sales. 
Another tendency of the finns within the drug industry 
was their trend toward merging smaller companies with larger, 
or older firms and therefore expanding and broadening their 
sales and earning basee 
One of the more obvious advantages to this drug industry 
is its continual development of new products, which the public 
is usually easily sold one This policy bolsters sales in 
both bull and bear cycles, and further adds to the stability 
of medicine drug sales.. According to the "Medicine Drug In-
dustry Survey 1 " the following companies are especially noted 
for both merging with smaller companies and developing new 
goods: Sterling Products, American Home Products, and Bristol 
~~yers.. These three companies in the years leading up to 1937 
made sound expansion policies which were highly constructive 
through the increased diversification obtained. The expansion 
policies improved the companies• competitive position, also, 
and increased their potentialities for added profit growths. 
During the bullish market of 1937, Sterling Products, &uerican 
Home Products and Bristol Myers were fully capable of further 
expanding their markets, and thus could expect to reap even 
larger pro.fi t s .. 
According to the "Medicine Drug Industry Survey" the 
merchandising policies of the different firms within the 
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Medicine Drug industry ti\J'ere the chief determinant of earnings. 
Advertising comprised the largest cost item for the industry, 
as the manufs.c turing methods were highly mechanized .. 
The labor and raw material costs of the industry were 
unusually stable during the 1930's, and the plant investment 
was unusually small.. In fact, costs 1vere so low for the 
medicine drug industry, that the 11 Medicine Drug Industry Sur-
vey" stated that of the medic:i.ne drug manufacturers• total 
revenue from sales, only about one third of the revenue was 
absorbed by production costs. 
However, the medicine drug field was a highly co~­
petitive field~ and therefore the merchandising and adver-
tising were of paramount importance. In order for one firm to 
keep its sales high, so that another firm would not attract 
away from the first firm's customers, the whole industry must 
have wide scale publicity., Advertisements in 1937 normally 
constituted 25 to 35% of the average proprietary dollar.. This 
left about one third of every average proprietary dollar for 
prof! t, which of course is abnormally large for any industry .. 
This wide prof! t margin feature of the medicine drug in-
dustry was not altogether advantageous for the firms within the 
drug industry, however, because the wide profit margins were 
constantly attracting new capital into the industry. Naturally, 
this new capital often meant new competitors, especially in the 
antiseptics and dentifrices, and by 1937 this competitive con-
dition caused advertising expenses to go even higher than the 
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normal 30 to 35%. As far as could be seen in 1937 9 the only 
way for the existing firms to maintain their position was to-
intensify and continue their advertising programs. There 
seemed little opportunity to reduce expenditures for this cost 
item .. 
One of the most depressing conditions of the medicine 
drug industry started after the crash in 1929.. A direct quo-
tation from the March, 1937 (Vol. 13, pp,. M-13) issue of the 
"Medicine Drug Industry Survey" should shot.v the unusual reper-
cussions which followed the industry's unrealistic attitude 
toward prices in the early thirties. 
"Reluctant to reduce prices even in the face of dras-
tically curtailed public purchasing pot.rer, proprietary drug 
manufacturers generally maintained quotations virtually at 
pre-depression levels in the three years through 1932. This 
policy created consQmer resentment and paved the way for re-
tail price cutting, private brand substitution and serious 
price and distribution problems. The use of nationally adver-
tised products as loss leaders in cut-price, fast turnover 
outlets likewise forced a reduction in retail price levels 
until distributors, no longer assured of a fair mark-up on 
nationally advertised merchandise, resorted to wide-scale 
private brand substitution .. " 
Naturally, with such practices as this in the drug in-
dustry, profits after 1932 were slashed greatly. In fact, the 
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drug industry suffered so greatly that the United States 
Congress passed several price stabilization acts to aid the 
crippled industry. 
The first of these acts was the Retail Drug Code which 
helped conditions for a time, but the act expired in 1935. 
The firr.as within the industry granted outright concessions to 
distributors in order to gain back their old markets, and the 
firms adopted various stabilization policies of their own. 
Even with these three measures--the Retail Drug Code, the 
granting of concessions, and the stabilization policies--the 
medicine drug industry's profits did not substantially gain, 
and the industry remained depressed in Wall Street's opinion. 
In 1936, the Fair Trade Laws were enacted which allowed 
manufacturers to decide their own resale price for dis-
tributors. Under this legislation, the goods could not be 
undersolde This set of laws was the first effective 
stabilizing aid the medicine drug industry had received since 
1932.. The Fair Trade Laws, according to "Standard Trade and 
Securities," improved manufacturing men and dealers' relation-
ships. It also aided in drastically reducing private brand 
substitution, and finally, the Fair Trade Laws eliminated the 
cut-price distributors from the competitive industry. 
Other legislation affecting the medicine drug industry 
was under consideration by Congress during 1937. The Pure Food 
and Drug Act of 1906 was too mild to stop the sale of many 
spurious drugs. The Tugwell Bill which was introduced in the 
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early thirties was too harsh to be passed by Congress. The 
Copeland Bill in 1937 which was passed that year modified the 
Tugwell Bill, and was the answer to the medicine drug indus-
try's trade objectives. This Bill eventually rid the industry 
of bad manufacturers. 
In summarizing the outlook for the industry as a whole, 
certain investment principles should be kept in mind.. First, 
the earnings and dividend payments of representative drug 
companies over a period of years leading up to 1937 showed far 
less violent fluctuations than the average industrial. This 
could be expected from the stable characteristics of the field. 
The inelastic demand for the industry's commodity plus the 
industry price war beginning in 1932 placed the medicine drug 
industry's securities in an unattractive light, as far as Wall 
Street's popular opinion went. 
The drug industry was fortified with large cash reserves, 
and since about one third of each proprietary dollar was profit, 
the bulk of the industry's earnings was turned over to the 
stockholders,. Even the Wall Street publications like "Stan-
dard and Poor•s" and "Moody's" which urged the sale of the 
industry's stocks, admitted that the stocks were selling at a 
low price earning ratio in 1937 .. 
The final investment principle to remember concerning 
the medicine drug industry of 1937 was that the firms within 
the industry were highly susceptible to new competitors. An 
investor should have watched in 1937 for the companies which 
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could successfully handle this competition problem. 
Now that the industry has been investigated, let us look 
at our firm--Bristol Myers--which was one of the leading com-
panies in the medicine drug industry of 1937. 
According to the 1937 edition of "Standard and Poor's" 
Bristol Myers Company achieved independent status in 1933. 
The company soon became a leading producer of pr0prietary 
drugs. Bristol-Myers nationally advertised lines included in 
1937 Sal Hepatica, Ipana toothpaste, Vitalis, and Mum. 
Bristol Myers products were distributed throughout the 
United States and in many foreign countries, and the manage-
ment of 1937 was believed to follow aggressive merchandising 
policies which had led to the establishment of the more impor-
tant products listed above. The company also purchased two 
more smaller units in 1934 .. 
According to "The Medicine Drug Industry Survey" of 
March, 1937 (Vol .. 13, pp. M-15)" "The combined influences of 
successful merchandising policies and added income from ac-
quisitions enabled the concern to increase its earning powers 
steadily through 1931, while the recession since that date has 
been relatively moderate. In 1934, the company adopted sales 
policies designed to prevent distribution to cut price outlets 
and to cement deal relations, while the Federal excise tax on 
cosmetics was absorbed.. Sales expanded considerably and the 
firm, in contrast to the industry, has continued recovery 
through 1936. Because of the strong finances, the company 
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should continue to distribute the greater part or earnings as 
dividends.n 
A depressed industry theorist would likely consider 
Bristol Myers a very good investment during the bull market ror 
1937. The shares which were selling at about 40 during the 
bull marl~et of 1937 were shares which had had continuous divi-
dends through the depression (when Bristol Myers was called by 
a different name) and the earnings in 1937 were expected to be 
even larger than the $3.31 dividend of 1936. Certainly the 
medicine drug industry was in a depressed condition in that it 
did have problems ·as a whole to work out" But the exceptional 
companies like Bristol Myers, Sterling Products, had found 
their own solution to the industry's problems, and were there-
by ~~king a good record on their own. However, the Wall Street 
publications ignored these differences as can be noted from 
the direct quotations given below from "Moody's Industrial 
Survey"of JYiarch 29, 1937, and August 31, 1937" 
"" ... in regard to Bristol M:yers, a trend of increased 
sales and declining profit margins has been characteristic of 
its industry in the past several years. From the standpoint of 
net profit, sales have increased somewhat more rapidly than 
profit margins have declined for Bristol Myers"' and the com-
pany's financial position is strong. However, the stock lacks 
attraction from an appreciation standpoint due to uncertain 
industry prospects .. " 
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From the same source on August 31~ 1937, we find, 
"Despite the great stability of earnings shown by the company 
in recent years, the longer term outlook is regarded as un-
favorable, and the stock promises to prove a relatively un-
interesting holding.. Sale is recommended of' Br:i_stol l\1.yerst 
Stocke 11 Again, we see that where the depressed indus try 
theorist would choose to buy a stock, the Wall Street pub-
lications would advise him not to buy. 
As a final comparison, let us look at the depressed 
stock from the air transport industry. 
The air transport industry is unique among the other 
depressed industries discussed in this paper, in that there 
is considerable material available concerning the industry. 
There are two main reasons for this: first, the industry is 
comparatively young, and thus stimulates public curiosity, 
and second, the air manufacturing industry was considered by 
the Magazine of Wall Street and Barron's to be among the best 
industries for investment in 1937.. Therefore, the Wall Street 
publications would group the air transport and air manufac-
turing industries together in their discussions of the indus-
tries, and by contrast, they hoped to make the aviation m®_nu-
facturing industry look even better over the air transport in-
dustry. 
It was not difficult to foresee in 1937 a long era of 
expansion and progress for the aviation industry. However, it 
was by no means easy to translate the vision of expansion into 
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practical investment procedure during the bull market of 1937o 
Avistion stocks for both the air transport and manufacturing 
were still considered speculations rather than investments" 
The transportation companies showed promise of obtaining 
much better profits over the coming years than in the recent 
past, but the ultimate profitability of that phase of the in-
dustry was sure to be considerably influenced by n~il payment 
and possible Gover~ment ~ontrol through the ICC; therefore, 
the outcome of these factors was hard to predict. 
According to "Moody's", the industry was in its second 
phase of expansion., The ini tiel phase of expansion of the 
late '20's--when airplane output increased five-fold in four 
years--was compared with the "horseless carriage" period of 
the automobile industry thirty years ago., It was considered 
characteristic of any new industry to go through an early 
period of mushroom growth, surrounded by an environment of 
public scepticism regarding the future value and place of the 
new mode or product in the economic structure. This charac-
teristic, according to Moody's, was especially true of the 
transportation industrye 
Moody's described the second phase of expansion as the 
phase of expansion which comes after the demonstrated proof of 
the value and worth of the new product or service, and is 
characterized by a great expansion in physical volume of 
business and by increasingly keen competition for the avail-
able business, resulting eventually in corporate consolidation 
77 
and concentration of the business into relatively few large 
units. 
In 1937 it was entirely probable that the aviation in-
dustry would go through the typical growth sequence. In many 
respects the industry was comparable then to the automobile 
industry of the previous generation, when many companies were 
in the field and before the great consolidations that have 
dominated the industry in its later years of comparative 
maturity., 
Therefore, in 1937 it was quite as formidable a task for 
investors to foresee the future giants of the aviation industry 
as it was in 1912-- 25 years earlier--to foresee the building 
of a General Motors~ or the conversion of a bankrupt company 
within a few years to one of the three largest units in the 
industry by a Chrysler. 
For these two reasons, namely that the air transport 
industry had lapsed from its fast growth of its first expan-
sion period into a period of poor earnings, and because the 
future of the air transport industry was so unsettled, the 
securities of the firms within the air transport industry were 
unpopular with the public, and were thus selling in a de-
pressed condition. 
However, within this depressed industry, there were 
certain companies which warranted examination from potential 
investors because in the air transport industry as well as 
the medicine drug industry and the textile industry, some 
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firms were exceptions to the rule of being depressede Yet, 
these exceptions in the air transport industry as well as in 
the two previously discussed industries were judged by the 
investing public as being afflicted with the ills of the in-
dustry, and consequently the stocks were selling in a de-
pressed manner in 1937. 
However, by 1937 the whole industry of aviation had 
begun to stride forward from its stagnation of the earlier 
th:l.rties, and both the manufacturing and transport branches 
for the aeronautical trade had made important improvements 
during 1936.. According to the "Air Transportation Industry 
Survey" the year of 1937 was expected to witness additional 
large expansion.. nA record volume of military purchases had 
been supplemented by increased commercial demand and, in view 
of early heavy backlogs leading builders of planes, engines 
and equipment were assured of near-capacity operations for a 
long time ahead .. n16 
For the transport section of the industry, statistics 
from 1936 were also encouraging. According to the 1937 
edition of Standard and Poor's, we find that mail was up 43% 
in 1936 over the 1935 level. Passenger traffic hit a new peak 
in 1936 which meant a 45% increase over the previous 1935 
level.. Even the express business had a 45% increase over the 
figure for 1935, and with business recovery, better planes, 
16. Standard Trade and Securities Service, Air Transportation 
Industry Survey, Vol~ 12, December, 19)6; pp. A-7. 
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and better know-how for flying~ made the whole industry look 
forward to making profits again, after the long period of 
deficits. 
The firms within the transport industry which were in a 
strong enough position to take advantage of the host of ad-
vantageous conditions culminating in 1937 could easily turn 
the year into a beginning of a long trend upward. The stocks 
were all selling in a depressed market because they were 
evaluated on the depressing conditions which made their stock 
prices decline at the end of their first growth period. But 
the industry was overcoming these depressing elements by 1937, 
and the strongest company within the industry was quite likely 
to be a good investment~ according to the reasoning of a 
depressed industry theorist. 
Four of the big airlines in 1937 were United, American, 
TWA, and Pan American. Each airline had definite possibili-
ties of becoming the number one airline of the country: United 
flew the most passenger miles, American had introduced the 
best planes into the industry, TWA had the most progressive 
management~ and Pan American was expanding the most quickly. 
For this latter reason and several others~ Pan American Air-
lines will be used as our example of a depressed stock within 
17 
the air transport industry. 
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Pan American's biggest news of 1936 was the granting of 
its new trans-Pacific route. The route was to be regularly 
flown starting in 1937. Traffic along the rest of Pan Am's 
routes had expanded enormously over the years leading up to 
1934, and the airline was bringing hard pressure against the 
CAA for trans-Atlantic routes. This route, if obtained, would 
give the company a round the world route. 
A glance at the 1936 balance sheet and earning data of 
Pan American will show the strong financial position., Ac-
cording to "Standard Trade and Statistics of 1937" the Pan 
American air line had consistently stayed in a stronger finan-
cial position than any of the other air lines. Its earnings 
had been consistently greater, too. 
Though the company l..r as not the first airline to intro-
duce better planes into the industry, Pan American's manage-
ment was determined to stay ahead of the times in the future, 
and even in 1937 the company negotiated to be the first to 
receive the great Douglas and Boeing planes which, in 1953, 
are fondly called the workhorses or the air lines. 
irlith the future looking so bright for the air lines, in 
contrast to the stock market's evaluation of the industry's 
securities, it seems apparent why a depressed industry theorist 
~J\Tould consider Pan American stock in 1937 a security tvorth 
purchasing .. 
From the 1938 edition of Moody's we find the balance 
sheet and earnings data: 
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Cash Inven.- Receiv- ---Current--- Net Net 
Items tories ables Assets I,iabs., Sales Income 
-----------------------In millions of dollars----------------
1 .. 55 1 .. 1-J-8 
Capitalization: 
Bonds $27,750;000 
Capital Stock 6,142,012 
L~ .. 85 1 .. 39 10 .. 92 0 .. 96 
$1 par 
We have now concluded our first comparisons between the 
three most popular stocks in 1937 and the three stocks which 
t...rere selling in a depressed market.. On the one hand 'bve find 
the ~vall Street publications advocating the sale of the de-
pressed securities and the purchase of ·the popular securities., 
On the other hand, we find the depressed industry theorists 
selling their popular securities and buying the depressed 
issues. The next chapter will be spent in describing the out-
come of the six stocks by the next bull marl{et which catile about 
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CHAPTER V 
Having investigated the three ''Blue Chip" stocks chosen 
as representative of the quality section of the 1937 bull mar-
ket, and having also studied three stocks from a similar 
period though these latter three stocks tvere of an unpopular 
nature, let us now proceed to the next bull raarket and choose 
six stocks to study from it. Three of these stocks will also 
be from the popular section of the stock market, while the 
other three stocks will come from the depressed industries of 
1946. We shall therefore examine six stocks from 1937 to 1946, 
and six stocks from 1946 to 1952 before we draw any con-
clusions concerning the worthiness of either of the stock 
groups .. 
The Wall Street of 1946 differed greatly from the Wall 
Street of 1937" The 1946 Wall :street feared much--strikes, a 
market downturn, a business recession, and even Administration 
policiese The Wall Street of 1937 could predict little else 
than "a brighter outlook for business .. " In 1946, nBarron•s," 
"The Magazine of Wall Street, n ttrvroody' s Stock Survey," and 
"Standard and Poor's" all spoke of a long continuing bull mar-
ket and of buying defensive securities in the same breath .. 
All the 1946 Wall Street publications spoke of the future's 
uncertainties, but the publications still advised their readers 
as to what to buy and w.That to sell. 
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In further contrast to the 1937 conditions where the 
Wall Street publications almost unanimously picked the same 
industries and in some instances even chose the same individual 
securities such as Bethlehem Steel for investment~ the 1946 
conditions seemed to be interpreted differently by every pub-
lication, and within these publications there was great 
variety of opinion from issue to issue$ 
So because of this widespread diversity of recommen-
dations, perhaps the best way to see which recommendations 
should be used as criteria for helping us.choo$e stocks would 
be to find which industries were the most popular with inves-
tors during the latter part of 1945 and the early part of 1946. 
After discovering these top preferences, we can then match the 
most often bought securities with the securities advocated by 
the Wall Street publications. 
In the February 2, 1946 issue of "The Magazine of Wall 
Streetn we find the following quotation from the article 
"Percentage Gains Scored in 1945 by Major Groups Comprising 
1'1Tall Street Common Stock Index., n (Page 504) 
ttThe great bull market that started around the middle of 
1942 has already carried 12 groups through their 1929 tops., 
They are air lines, automobile accessories, bus lines, con-
tainers, department and mail order stores, drugs and toilet 
articles, food brands, liquors, petroleums~ shipbuilding, soft 
drinks, sugar and textiles. 
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"on the other hand, 12 groups are still below their 19.37 
high: These are agricultural implements, baking, construction, 
copper and brass, finance companies, furniture, gold mining, 
machinery, non-ferrous metals, railroad equipment, railroe.ds, 
realty, steel and iron, tobacco and variety stores.," 
Wall Street recognized that the first 12 groups men-
tioned were high--beyond the heretofore unattainable 1929 
levels .. Under those same conditions in 1937, Wall Street would 
have undoubtedly recommended any of the 12 securities as good 
quality investments.. But in 1946, the great bull market had 
lasted for four years., and some stocks such as those from the 
liquor industry had increased so greatly in capital appre-
ciation that even the Wall Street publications said, "some 
stocks in a bull market reach their peaks sometime before the 
averages real!h their highest level .. " 
"Standard and Poor's" (as well as the other \'\l'all Street 
publications) hastened to say that there was no real "danger" 
concerning the stability of the market.. Said "Moody's Stock 
Survey" on February 18, 1946, "The end of the bull market is 
not in sight and investors who hold stocks for their long term 
benefits should continue to hold them .. n18 
None of the Wall Street publications cited in this chap-
ter instructed their readers not to buy any or all of the 
"high 12n of 1946, though the publications did not urge invest-
18.. Moody's Stock Survey, February 18, 1946, Vol .. .38:, No .. 7, 
pp. 671. 
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ments into all the industries with the implications that one 
was still as good an investment as another. 
On the other hand, not one of the publications even 
hinted that any of the securities which were--even by Wall 
Street standards--selling high, should be sold. And, as may 
be expected, a great many of the securities within the 1946 
"high 12" were vigorously recommended by the Wall Street ad-
visory publications. 
In attempting to be completely fair to the Wall Street 
publications, we shall attempt to investigate the securities 
within the three industries which were advocated most strongly 
at the beginning of 1946. 
As has already been indicated, the public was still 
buying in early 1946 such stocks as the liquor stocks and the 
movie stocks, but by that time Wall Street was advising other 
stocks a great deal more strongly for future investment. As 
a result of this switch in recommendations by Wall Street, the 
movie stocks and liquor stocks prices began dropping in 1946 
and those drops continued well past 1950. 
The investing public began buying more heavily other 
stocks as advocated by the Wall Street publications. 
The first three months of 194.6 found the Wall Street 
publications pushing the following industries most strongly: 
Textiles, Dairy Products, Containers, Public Utilities, Retail 
Stores (including Mail-order houses), Soft Drinks, and small 
steel producers. 
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The February issues of "The Magazine of Wall Street.~~" 
"Barron's," and "Moody's Stock Survey" of March 11, 1946, are 
in virtual agreement on these investment quality industries. 
Each of these publications added other industries to the list 
of seven industries already presented, but only the seven pre-
sented were recommended in some manner by all three of the 
Wall Street publications. More specific treatment of recom-
mendations concerning these stocks by the other Wall Street 
publications will be written in the final chapter of this 
paper. 
From within the group of seven quality investment indus-
tries, we can see by a comparison of the groups bought by the 
investment public in the first months of 1946, that the tex-
tiles, containers, soft-drinks, and retail stores securities 
were both bought in great quantities by the public, and at 
the same time recommended strongly by the Wall Street pub-
lications., 
Since we have discussed the textile industry in an 
earlier part of this paper though under different conditions--
it will probably be less confusing to discuss the remaining 
three industries as representative of the 1946 ttBlue Chips" 
and since the Wall Street publications deemed these securities 
on a virtual par anyway, the container industry, the retail 
store industry9 and the soft drink industry--these industries 
will be discussed as the three representative industries for 
the "blue chip register" from the 1946 stock:market .. 
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As has already been indicated in this paper, the Wall 
Street publications were leery of the future of the stock 
market by the first three months of 1946 .. From "Moody's Stock 
Survey" of March 11, 1946., we find the following predictions 
under the heading of "Stock Prospects and Reco:mmendations.," 
This quotation presents in summary form the thinking of Wall 
Street in 1946 .. 
First, said "Moody' a", the bull stock market that began 
in 1942 had no appearance of being completed. (The date of 
this statement was March 11, 1946.) 
"Moody'a"went on to say, ttThe stock market has just been 
interrupted by a rude shake out, however, and its forward move-
ment is unlikely to be immediately resumed since time is re-
quired for the revival of sentiment. The business scene 
probably needs some clarification before the market can gain 
vigor.," 
Wall Street was confident that the bull stock market was 
still going onward and upward.. "Moody's" said, "Stock prices 
should rise to new high bull market levels over the latter part 
of this year. The market has not lost its dynamic, fast 
moving quality~" 
However, "Moody's" did warn that good times were not 
here forever.. The Wall Street publications had learned their 
lessons from the 1929 and 1937 crashes, and this time the 
publications were determined to be more realistic.. In the 
second week of March, "Moody's" said, ''It is a reasonable 
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possibility that this prospective upward reach of the ms.rket 
will turn out to be its final advance, completing the whole 
movement. A year from now more serious trouble may loom for 
business and the markets. This is not a hint that a repetition 
of 1929-32 in the stock market may be ahead, for that does not 
seem to be even an outside possibility. But a minor depres-
sion could develop some time in 1947, and with it a severe 
reaction in the stock market. 
"While the movement of stock prices over the major part 
of 1946 is clearly upward, we believe some individual stocks 
will be reaching their best prices of the whole movement well 
in advance of the averages. Care must, therefore, be taken 
increasingly in the selection of stocks for purchase. A con-
servative bias in buying stocks henceforward is a good rule. 
"The phase into which the market is now likely to move 
should be the most speculative of any since the bull market 
began. It is a phase which promises speculative profits. It 
is too early to do general selling in anticipation of the bull 
19 
market's eventual end., n 
One thing should be pointed out at this time. This 
paper is dealing with those stocks which the Wall Street pub-
lications considered would be good investment stocks in 1946. 
Those stocks which were recommended for short-term, speculative 
purposes have been ignored in this paper., 
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From Moody's "Stock Survey" of 1946, page 598.~~ we .find 
the following quotation: "The following list comprises stocks 
that should prove to be productive investments. We recommend 
them at this time as purchases for .funds that are earmarked 
for stock investment .. " The partial list is presented below .. 
The whole list is not given, since the other stocks would not 
be applicable to this paper, since they will not be studied 
individually at this timee 
Issue Per Share Earnings Dividends 1946 Recent 
1945 1944 1944 1945 1944 Price Range Price 
First 9 mos .. Annual 
Mong.tv. 2.56 2 .. 48 3 .. 81 2 .. 00 2 .. 00 83.5 72.25 82e75 
Nat'l c .. 1.40 0,.70 1 .. 80 0.,85 OeJ..J.5 30 .. 15 24 .. 00 24 .. 50 
Pepsi c .. 0~75 0..,85 le02 .83 0..,83 43 .. 00 36.00 39 .. 50 
Taking the industries in reverse order from the presen-
tation above, let us first investigate the 1946 securities o.f 
the soft drink industry. According to "IVJ:oody's Stock Survey" 
of March 11, 1946, the stocks of Pepsi Cola and Canada Dry 
were the soft drink stocks which were still fairly priced .for 
accun1ulation for long term investment in March of 1946. Dr .. 
Pepper was considered a more speculative issue than either 
Pepsi Cola or Canada Dry. Coca Cola and Nehi were expected to 
do very well in the coming years also, and the stock from these 
two .fi~us were considered worth holding,. Pepsi Cola stock was 
considered the most outstanding buy in the soft-drink industry, 
however, and Wall Street advocated the purchase of Pepsi Cola 
securities when the common stock was selling at 40. 
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Taking the soft drink industry as a whole, the 1946 
opinion of the industry was that the temporary restraints on 
the youthful industry would soon be lifted. Of course, at 
that time, the biggest stumbling block plaguing the whole in-
dustry was the sugar problem. Sugar was still scarce, and 
this important commodity was expected to be rationed to the 
·sof·t drink firms throughout 1946 and possibly into 1947., The 
average sugar allotments were expected to be increased to the 
individual firms by about 10% over the 1945 sugar allotment 
level., According to "Moody's Stock Survey" the figures for 
the sugar allotment were the follo-vling: "In our estimates of 
the third and fourth quarters sales and earnings for 1946 we 
have given recognition to the fact that the seasonally high 
months of soft drink consumption are May through August. 
These months usually account for 43% of the industry's annual 
sales. We have assumed that applicable quotas will rule higher 
in those important months of 1946 than the quotas of last year. 
"We cannot assume more than gradual improvement in sugar 
supplies through the first half of 1947, and our estimates have 
been tempered accordingly. Nor can we count on increased 
economies by diversion of sugar from lesser to major selling 
products and reduction of sugar content. These economies to 
offset shortages have been fully exploited for some time"" 20 
The sugar problem was the biggest problem facing the soft 
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drink industry in 1946, but the industry also had other prob-
lems. The war-caused difficulty of obtaining new and replace-
ment bottling equipment was another big restrictive factor 
for the soft-drink industry. In 1946, trucks and manpower 
were also inadequate for the whole industry's needs. In 
spite of these large problems which faced the industry, the 
Wall Street publications believed that the industry had some 
uncommon advantages in its operations which easily outweighed 
the difficulties caused by the problems mentioned above. 
The big advantage which the soft-drink industry shared 
was the operation cost advantage. This advantage will be 
illustrated below by material which was taken from the 1946 
edition of "Moody's Stock Survey. n21 
Principal Basic Costs in Soft Drink Manufacturing 
(As reported to the Bureau of the u.s. Census) 
(Value of the Final Product--100%) 
Principal Raw Materials 
*Flavoring extracts, coloring, 
Sugar 
Crowns 
Carbonic gas 
Labels 
Acids 
Distribution Costs 
Manufacturing salaries and wages 
Electricity and fuel 
Total of above costs 
33.5% 
9 .. 9 
7 .. 6 
1.1 
52 .. 1% 
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Wall Street pointed out that ~rom these ~igures it would 
seem that the labor and sugar costs were much smaller in re-
lation to sales than many people would believe. Regardless~ 
however~ o~ whether ~lavoring extracts~ colorings~ etc.~ cost 
more than bulk sugar and labor combined, the important thing, 
in the "Moody's Stock Survey 1 s" opinion was that the industry's 
margin o~ gross man~acturing profit was comparatively large. 
This is certainly borne out by the ~igures above. What is 
not included in the above expenses of the industry, however, 
are the high costs which the industry bad to expend ~or ad-
vertising and promotional efforts. It can be argued, however, 
that the unusually high expenditures ~or promotional purposes 
had a great deal to do with the rapid growth o~ the so~t drink 
industry .. 
With the question of costs and problems out o~ the way~ 
the next aspect o~ the industry which Wall Street would have 
typically investigated was the question of dividend policy. 
In the March 11, 1946~ issue of "Moody's Stock Survey" we 
find this quick "dividend summary": "Reinvested earnings com-
pound rapidly in the so~t drink industry; the margin of profits 
is high; the inventory turnover rapid:; the necessary fixed 
property investment is comparatively low in relation to sales .. 
The established enterprises are enabled, thereby, to pay large 
portions of earnings in dividends--the dollars held back work 
faster than in many other industries .. " 
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Though the war did bring its problems to the so£t drink 
industry--as well as to all other industries--the war also 
brought some advantages to the soft drink industry. One of 
the greatest benefits to the firms within the soft drink in-
dustry came as a result of the dispensing of so£t drinks in 
military cmnps and war plants which naturally served to give 
the products of the soft drink industry greater popularity. 
In discussing Pepsi Cola apart from the soft-drink in-
dustry9 we would say first that in 19469 Pepsi Cola was the 
second largest factor in the soft drink industry. The fact 
that the Pepsi Cola bottles were large-size was credited with 
bringing the company initial success. The Pepsi Cola sub-
sidiary "Evervessn was also considered in 1946 to have great 
potential in the soft-drink market. 
According to "Moody's Stock Surveyn the Pepsi Cola Com-
pany acquired the Matanzas Sugar Estates~ Inc. 9 in 1943$ and 
thereby achieved self-sufficiency in the important raw :material 
of sugar, but because of the rationing system which was still 
on in 1946$ Pepsi Cola had received no benefits from this 
property. 
According to the 1947 edition of "Standard and Poor 1 s 11 , 
the Pepsi Cola Company operated in 1946 a concentrate plant in 
the United States and Canada and nine bottling plants in this 
countrye There were three more bottling plants in Canada and 
one each in Cuba$ Mexico~ and England. 
Also from "Standard and Poor's" we find that the earnings 
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from foreign subsidiaries amoUnted to 25~ per share in 1945, 
and according to "rJioody v s Stock Survey's" prediction, the 
earnings of the foreign subsidiaries were likely to increase 
sizeably over the coming years. 
The whole picture for Pepsi Cola looked glowing to the 
Wall Street publications. They urged their readers to buy 
Pepsi Cola stock in 1946, when the stock was selling at 40--
the highest level it had ever reached. 
The next common stock which had, in Wall Street pub-
lications' opinion, quality in 1946 was the stock of the mail 
order companies. The Wall Street publications were particu-
larly glib about the possibilities of the stock of Sears Roebuck 
and Montgomery \rlard., and recommendations came from all sides 
to purchase the securities of one or both of the two big mail 
order firms for the purpose of capital appreciation on the 
co:rn:m.on stocks. 
Said nMoody's Stock Survey" of March, 1946, nEveryone 
knows that the outlook for the mail order business is favor-
able. There is a great unfilled demand for consumers• durable 
goods. The farming community, an important customer, has never 
been richer. Lately it has benefited by another increase in 
grain prices. Urban dwellers, increasing in importance as mail 
order patrons, receive increased wages and have large savings. 
The nation as a whole looks like a good customer for some time 
to come. n 
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It was admitted by the security analysts working for 
the Wall Street publications that the prices of the mail 
order firms' common stocks had risen sharply by the third 
month of 1946. But instead of advocating the sale of the 
securities when they had soared to unprecedented heights on 
the stock market, the Wall Street publications still favo1•ed 
buying the stocks. In justifying their recommendations of 
buying the stocks at such high prices, Wall Street reasoned 
s:lmilarly: The stocks of the leading mail order concerns have 
done well marketwise, but have they really discounted their 
favorable prospects at the top 1946 prices? Wall Street of 
course said, "No. n "Moody• s Stock Survey" said on March 11, 
1946, 11 The present prices for the shares of the two leaders ..... 
Montgomery Ward and Sears Roebuck •• .,do not overdiscount pros-
pee ti ve earnings as we estimate them. Since they normally sell 
at reasonably high multiples of earnings, we expect a satis-
factory degree of further market appreciation in both Mont-
gomery Ward and Sears Roebuck .. " 
The reasoning of the Wall Street publications will not 
be commented upon at this point in this paper, though in all 
fairness some supporting evidence for the Wall Street argu:ments 
will be presented. 
Before the establishment of the retail stores of Mont-
gomery Ward and Sears Roebuck, these leading.mail order houses 
depended heavily on the prosperity of the farmer. But in the 
period of two decades preceding the 1946 bull market, both 
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Montgomery Ward and Sears Roebuck became large store opera-
tors in cities and towns throughout the country. Therefore, 
the consumers from both the cities and rural areas con-
tributed to the mail order stores' revenuese 
During the war, Montgomery Ward and Sears Roebuck were 
faced with the reoccurring and universal trouble of goods 
shortages. By 1946,~~ goods were again becoming available in 
large quL~tities. Therefore, the absence of goods shortages, 
and the merchandising skill which brought the merchandise of 
the mail order firms within the easy reach of all consumers 
before the war would certainly serve to help the industry nmke 
money .. 
Coupled with the possibilities of improving sales was 
the possibility of further expansion in 1946 for the mail or-
der firms of Montgomery Ward and Sears Roebucko The great 
expansion already mentioned by these two leading mail order 
companies was believed by Wall Street in 1946 to not hamper 
further sizable growth for them, because of their integrated 
operations.. Warehouses, locally placed, quickly served all 
the regions in the country, whether the orders came in by mail 
o:r• through the stores., Around these warehouses, an enlarged 
volume of business could be easily extended, and it was be-
lieved by the 1946 investors that both Montgomery Ward and 
Sears Roebuck would take advantage of the circumstances cited 
above and enlarge., For this reason of further expansion which 
was envisioned to mean more stores, enlarged units, and wider 
lines of merchandise, the stocks from Montgomery Ward and 
from Sears Roebuck was considered of investment quality. 
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Wall Street's opinion of the smaller mail order or-
ganizations within the mail order industrywas not so compli-
mentary, as was the above opinion of the two large mail order 
firms. 11Moody' s Stock Survey" said in ]),1arch, 1946, "The 
smaller mail order organizations, Alden's and Spiegel's, are 
not as favorably situated for expansion as the two big firms. 
However, they also plan to expand by constructing additional 
facilities and acquiring existing stores. But their ground-
work for expansion is less clearly defined than for the large 
companies because they are now so centralized. At present 
both have their mail order plants in Chicago. Alden's leases 
space in six separate locations, all in that city, and opera-
tions are hindered in serving customers to the fullest extent. 
The company plans a site in Chicago for a single plant 
capable of handling an expanded volumes 
nsubstantial improvements are planned for Spiegel's mail 
order plant; studies are being made to determine the advis-
ability of plants located in various parts of the country to 
reduce distribution costs and get faster consumer service. 
Spiegel's rapid acquisition of other retail chains complicates 
the problem. 
nThe outlook for :mail order shares is good for this year 
(1946) and 1947. In expansion, the present structure of the 
two leaders in this industry give them. advantages over the 
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smaller less diversified competitors, but the same principle 
will operate to the advantage of the leaders again when the 
22 
time for contraction comes .. " 
Having established the fact with reasonable assurance 
that Wall Street did consider the securities of the two major 
firms within the mail order retail store industry as worthy of 
quality investment status~ let us now look briefly at the 
sec uri ties of one of the "Big Two n -- ~Iontgomery Ward and 
Company. 
According to the 1946 edition of "Standard and Poor's," 
Montgomery Ward & Company, Incorporated, obtained about 60% 
of its sales volume through a chain of about 632 retail stores 
located in every state; and the remainder of sales came 
through the mail order division. Mail order customers and 
retail stores were serviced through nine central warehouses 
located throughout important sections of the country. Over 
200 catalog order offices were maintained to take orders for 
shipments from the mail order houses. The company's manufac-
turing facilities were limited, and they supplied only a minor 
portion of the company's merchandise .. 
The company added about $77 .. 1 million to working capital 
during the period between 1940 and 1946~ and its position 
financially was considered exceptionally strong. It was pos-
sible in 1946 that if potential sales volume materialized over 
the ensuing years, that the company could require additional 
22. Ibid., p. 320 .. 
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funds particularly since it was probable that it would con-
tinue financing its own installment accounts. In 1936 the 
company financed through the offering of rights to common 
stockholders.. On July 22, 1946, Montgomery Ward stock was 
selling at 75¢, and according to "Moody's Stock Survey," 
t'lfhich said, "We recommend the Montgomery Ward common stock t:or 
long tel:"1'11 investment.," So,jl Wall Street said, "Buy Montgomery 
Ward at 75 1/2," since the other major Wall Street publica-
tions were in virtual agreement with Moody's concerning the 
investment status of the stock., 
The final "Blue Chip" security which we shall discuss 
from the 1946 bull market is the National Container Company 
common stock., 
For reasons of unusual diversity and industry differences, 
the container industry as a whole is barely discussed by the 
1946 Wall Street publications. Ordinarily with stocks such 
as the stock of Montgomery Ward or Bethlehem Steel, the Wall 
Street publications first give a discussion of the industry 
as a whole, and then a shorter discussion of the firms within 
the industry .. 
But in 1946, the container industry was not generally 
discussed, and instead, the firms within the industry were 
given ._larger spreads., It may be well to point out at this 
point that the container industry, like the retail stores, 
and soft drink industry, was considered by Wall Street in 1946 
to be one of the most popular of all industries for investment. 
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The reader will probably remember that the container industry 
was listed at the beginning of 1946 as being one of the in-
dustries which had broken through its 1929 high level point. 
To Wall Street$) this fact seemed to indicate that the future 
looked brighter than ever for the stock. To the depressed 
industry theorist the high selling point meant quite another 
thing$) but these differences of opinion will be discussed 
more fully in the final chapter or· this paper. 
The National Container Corporation in 1946, according 
to the 1946 edition of "Standard and Poor's," was a well 
integrated company which had been progressing rapidly. 
In 1945, National Container Corporation's sales ad-
vanced 6.3% to $18.8 million, but rising costs and heavier 
plant accounts, higher operating charges, and unusually high 
depreciation narrowed the overall profit margin for 1945. A 
10~3% operating profit contraction resulted for 1945. Income 
taxes took more than 70% of pre-tax profit, however, and 
cushioned net earnings, whichwere little changed from 1944-
Net working capital gained about $1.6 million in 1946 
after plant expenditures; National Container Corporation also 
acquired the Ontogagon Fibre Company for $9,000,000, and also 
retired more than $250,000 of funded debt. 
From the 1946 edition of "Standard and Poor 11 s 11 we find 
that the sales of National Container Corporation for the first 
six months of 1946 were $11.5 million, compared with $9.8 
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million for the same period in 194.5.. This reflected a con-
tinued high level of demand and easier raw material supplies 
for the product.. A considerable expansion in operating in-
come, combined with substantially reduced liability for 
Federal taxes~ produced a sharp improvement in earnings per 
common share, which of course gave the price of the conm1on a 
sharp rise., 
Operations in 1946 were being expanded in nearly all of 
the company's divisions.. The relatively recently acquired 
Tomahawk Kraft Paper Company (which cost approximately $2 • .5 
million) was believed to materially increase the output of 
National Container Corporation. 
Wall Street expected the earnings to keep on increasing 
on the common stock, and e"Wen as late as October 7, 1946~ the 
stock of National Container Corporation was being recommended 
as being a good investment by nMoody w s Stock Survey" n 
But il;i March of 1946, "Moody'sn said, "Strengthened 
finances and the excellent growth outlook for integrated kraft 
container manufacturers such as National Container makes the 
company's common attractive both for holding mid acquiring .. 
Dividends probably will remain modest for a time because of 
working capital requirements to accommodate growth, but 
earnings aided by the increased OPA price ceiling announced 
recently for Fourdrinier kraft board, should improve sharply 
in 1946 with the whole trend upward for several years .. n23 
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At the time of this quotation, the price of National Container 
Corporation common stock was 30 1/2. 
And so, we have again summarized three stocks which the 
Wall Street publications and investors (guided by those same 
publications) believed to be of the highest investment 
quality. We will next describe our last group of stocks--
depressed, unpopular stocks--stocks that nobody would buy but 
a depressed industry theorist. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The depressed industry theorist in the 1946 bull 
market had an unusually difficult problem of trying to 
find stocks which were selling in a depressed state and 
at the same time met all the other requirements of a de-
pressed industry stock, because of the usual general 
scarcity of any undervalued stocks in such a bullish market. 
As has been indicated before in this paper, the 
scarcity of depressed industry stocks in an extended bull 
market has been taken by some security experts to indicate 
that a reversal in the market's rising trend is imminent. 
Certainly this observation was borne out in 1946, and though 
the Wall Street publications were also dubious of the future, 
they plunged bravely forth advising sales of some stocks and 
recommending the purchase of other stocks. 
The twelve groups of stocks which were still selling 
below their 1937 highs at the end of 1945 were naturally 
regarded by Wall Street as lagging behind the general market, 
and it is to those groups that we turn to first to give us a 
key to possible depressed industries. To refresh the readerus 
mind concerning the identity of the twelve groups, they 
are: Agricultural implements, Baking, Construction, Copper, 
Finance Companys, Furniture, Gold mining, Machinery, Non-
ferrous metals, Railroad,equipment, Railroads, Realty, Steel, 
Tobacco, and Variety stores. 
One point should be made clear at this time however, 
concerning the fact that these above-mentioned stocks at the 
end of 1945 were selling under their 1937 highs. Just because 
the industries listed above were selling lower in 1945 than 
they were in-1937 is no reason to believe that the same 
industries were selling cheaply. If the reader will pause 
to remember and compare the list of market leaders of 1937, 
to the list of market laggers of 191.'-6, he 1.-1ill note that 
the two lists are by no means mutually exclusive. 
The tvlelve lagging industries of 1946 printed in uThe 
l"'fagazine of Wall Street" do not include all of the rela-
tively low selling stocks in the 1946 bull market, either. 
The Wall Street publications of 1946 did not even bother to 
print information about some industries, since these indus-
tries were apparently so unpopular with the public. As in 
19 3 7, such publications as "!tfoody., s Stock Surveyn 'l:iould ad-
vocate the sale of stock in a depressed industry--such as the 
Bituminous Coal industry of 1946--and then promptly discon-
tinue any further comments on the industry. 
By the end of the first month of 1946, the Wall Street 
publications were virtually in agreement on their recom-
mendations concerning the securities of firms within the 
bituminous coal industry and the non-ferrous industry. To 
irJ'all Street, the stocks from the firms within these industries 
had no appeal--sale of the stocks was recommended. The 
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third industry in a depressed condition v1as actually split 
similarly to the air transport-air craft manufacturing split 
of the 1937 market. Part of the petroleum industry was 
booming--but the other part consisting of the gasoline 
section--was fast losing ground, and to the holders of 
securities in this declining segment, if/all Street said, 
HSell. 18 
These industries--the bituminous coal, oil, and non-
ferrous metal industry--were facing unusual, industry-wide 
problems in 1946 that made the securities of the industry 
sell low in the otherwise bull stock market. In discussing 
these industries, we shall discuss their problems and at the 
same time, attempt to point out how the stocks of certain 
firms within these depressed industries meet the require-
ments of depressed industry stocks. 
In the February 4, 1946 issue of "1'-ioody's Stock Surveyn 
the depressed condition of the gasoline industry within the 
petroleum industry was discussed at length. Since this 
nM:oody's 11 quotation points out the 1946 gas industry prob-
lems and at the same time gives the general Wall Street 
opinion concerning the stocks within the gas industry, the 
quotation in its entirity will be presented. 
"Indications of some price weakness have been developing 
in certain refined petroleum products, particularly gasoline. 
Within the past few weeks two major companies have announced 
reductions in posted gasoline prices; the first slash in 
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prices was by Standard Oil of Indiana in its midwestern 
marketing areas and, more recently Standard Oil of New 
Jersey released lm..rer price schedules for certain of its 
eastern marketing districts. Undoubtedly, a contributing 
cause has been the achievement of economies in refining 
methods and in transportation costs, but more fundamentally 
the reason is that inventories of gasoline have been piling 
up week after week and are now at dangerously high levels. 
Probably the situation will become worse along the eastern 
seaboard marketing areas when full tanker crew complements 
become available for moving the unusually heavy stocks at 
gulf coast terminals. 
vert appears likely that price cutting will become 
more prevalent, especially since the flow of new automobiles 
has been delayed by strikes. The heavy gasoline consuming 
season, which commences in March probably will not bring 
forth the demand expected after V-J Day. Offsetting this 
to some extent is the fact that contraction in volume of 
the industry as a whole has caused output to run about 5% 
better than had been predicted in the latter part of 1945. 
But supplies of gasoline are large in relation to prospec-
tive demands.u23 
.As a result of these gas industry problems, 18 Moody's 
23. Ibid., PP• 645 
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Stock Survey" made the following recommendations: Sell: 
Jktlantic Refining, 1'-iid-Continent Petroleum, Sinclair Oil, 
Standard Oil Co* of Ohio, Sun Oil, Tide Water Associated 
Oil, and Union Oil Coe of Californiae24 
In addition to the problems of the gas industry cited 
by the nMoodylls" quotation, there '\'.rere other less important 
troubles pointed out by the February "Standard & Poor's 
Industry Reporte 19 These problems were presented in an 
article under the heading of "NEvi NEAR TERM PROFITS OUTLOOK 
LESS SATISFACTORY" TUJ\BNORM.~L INVENTORY OF GASOLINE THREATENS 
ADDITIONAL AND MORE WIDESPREAD PRICE REDUCTIONS--DELAYED 
MOTOR C&~ PRODUCTION, REDUCED REGISTRATIONS, AND UNBAL-
ANCED PRICE STRUCTURE l-t\KE STOCK DEPRESSANTS .. u The article 
'W'l'let on to say, 11 The OPA ceilings on product prices have 
been a serious handicap to refinery operations and they 
have resulted in an abnormal over-accumulation of gasoline 
stocks, which in turn indicates future weakness in prices 
for the industry's money producte 11 
What the Wall Street publications did not take into 
consideration seriously when they \vere making their n sell" 
recommendations were the mid-term possibilities* In 1946 
the Wall Street publications were moving cautiously and pre-
dicting only for the short term except for the stocks which 
24. Ibid .. , pp. 645. 
108 
were considered to be of the highest quality, such as the 
three stocks discussed in the preceding chapter in this 
paper., 
The gasoline industry did have some glimmer of hope in 
the early months of 1946, as was later shovm in the 1947 
u Industry Stock Survey, 11 but which 't'\fas too far in the future 
for the Wall Street publications as a whole to accept as 
worthy of basis for prediction., 
As the security analysts could have seen--if they had 
bothered to look in 1946--when the price controls on gasoline 
were removed, the supply and demand brought the price struc-
ture into economic balance and permitted properly rounded 
refinery operations., In addition, the removal of the price 
controls closely coincided 'll'li th the resumption of the up-
trend in demand for gasoline, which came in the third 
quarter of 1946, and earnings in fue last six months of the 
year were a great deal higher than the earnings of the first 
six months., Beginning with 1947, consumption climbed to 
record peace-time levels and peak earnings were indicated 
for many companies in the industry., 
Consumption of petroleum and its products in 1946 was 
below the war inflated levels, but the consumption volume of 
1946 compared quite favorably to the volume of 1941--the last 
peacetime year., The gain in the consumption volume was ac-
complished by a substantial shift in product sales, with a 
necessary adjustment of refinery yields., Because of many 
109 
uncertainties incident to the new car production and the sharp 
decline in registrations since 1941, the gasoline demand de-
clinede However, consumption of fuel oils, distillates, and 
kerosene showed comparatively substantial gains$ 
The industry fact-finding board of 19Lj·6 recommended 
that the 18% rise in wages being granted should not be 
compensated by a corresponding increase in prices. Thus, 
the operating margins narrowed. 
From the pricing problems, and the unusually large sup-
plies of gasoline, it was obvious in 1946 that the profits 
from the first half of 1946 would be not only well below 
1945 but also substantially lower than 1941. However, the 
industry was practically assured from relief of price con-
trols, at the end of 1946 or the middle of 1947, and l>~hen 
this relief came, the earnings would quickly soar. nstan-
dard and Poor 11 s Industry Stock Report" admitted that '30ver 
the longer term, the strong underlying secular growth trend 
should lift volumes and profits to record levels.u The 
stocks within the gasoline. firms were in temporary diffi-
culties, and for these reasons, it was the Wall Street 
verdict that the stocks should be sold. The Wall Street 
publications advised the sale of the gasoline stocks even 
when the publications' writers expected that eventually 
the stocks were going to make good, as they, themselves, 
admitted. Such was the advice from Wall Street in March of 
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1946., Even as late as June, "Standard & Poor's Industry 
Stock Review" said, "Recent developments have considerably 
clarified the outlook for the oil industry this year. It is 
now apparant that first half earnings will run well below 
the year before, despite the high demand for gasoline, 
distillates and residual fuel oil,u Yet, in the last six 
months of 1946, the ceiling prices were lifted from the 
industry, and gasoline profits began to soar by 19t:-7., But 
by Wall Street standards of 19lt6, the intervening period 
'l...ras too long to nkeep liquidn and '\V'ait, or else retain the 
oil stocks already in the investors possession. 
From the 1946 edition of "Standard & Poor's" we find 
the following information concerning Sinclair Oil Cor-
poration--Sinclair Oil's securities, as the reader probably 
remembers, were among the securities which Wall Street ad-
vised its investors to sell in the early months of 1946., 
11Reduced sales of premium products cut gross operating 
income nominally in 1945'. Costs were higher and after an 
extraordinary charge of $1.14 a share for accelerated 
amortization of emergency facilities, taxable earnings 
fell 5'5'%. Taxes were sharply lower, however, holding the 
decline in net to 43%. \tUth unusual charges eliminated, 
earnings this year are expected to exceed moderately the 
$1.13 a share reported for 1945. Dividends probably will 
continue at ~;o. 25 quarterly. 
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nThe common stock tends to sell at a moderate price-
earning ratio, in reflection of the small domestic crude 
production in relation to refinery requirements. Develop-
ment of South American properties and extensive domestic 
exploration, however, will lessen dependence on this factore 
In view of the secular growth trend in petroleum product 
consumption, the shares have held in the past above 
average appeal." 
In the early months of 1946, Wall Street turned thumbs 
dowri on the oil-gasoline stocks, as has already been pointed 
out. Because of the influence which the publications' 
recommendations have with the investing public, the gasoline 
stock prices fell. At this point, when the typical Wall 
Street security analysts considered the gasoline stocks 
unattractive, the depressed industry theorist would take 
a longer range outlook of the industry, and finally buy 
some of the shares for long term investment. The company 
was financially strong and had an unassailable record for 
meeting its obligations and dividends regularly. Only in 
the relatively short period after the war did the industry 
have trouble, but in this short time, the stocks' lost face 
with the Wall Street investors, but at the same time gained 
considerable grace in the eyes of the depressed industry 
theorist. 
112 
The second depressed industry which we shall discuss 
from the 1946 stock market had the dubious distinction of 
having its discussions discontinued in "Moody•s Stock Survey" 
in 1946. The bituminous coal industry's problems were many, 
and because of these problems, the securities of the in- · 
dustry were unpopular and low-priced in 1946. To a de-
pressed industry theorist, the industry's stocks were selling 
low enough to warrant investment in the stocks--from the 
industry's best firms·. 
uThe Bituminous Coal Industry Survey" of January 1, 194-6 
presents the following resume of the coal industry. 
nReflecting estimated production losses of around 
27,000,000 tons resulting from wild-cat strikes and the 
unsuccessful attempt of the United Mine Workers to organize 
supervisory employees, soft coal output for the fuel year 
to end March 31, 1946 is expected to drop approximately '% 
to 579,000,000 tons. Moreover, beginning with the first 
quarter of 1946, the almost uninterrupted decline in produc-
tion in evidence since 1943 is expected to reverse, in view 
of the gradual easing of the labor supply. Hence, output 
this calendar year will probably compare favorably with 
estimated 1945 production of 578,500,000 tons. Since 
soft coal consumption should be maintained by the expansion 
of industrial production for civilian purposes, the necessity 
of rebuilding stockpiles, and larger export shipments, sales 
for some time to come vlill continue limited only by the 
ability to produce.,n25 
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Of course, in early 1946, the threat of a general coal 
strike (which eventually occurred) clouded the whole picture 
for the investment status of the coal securities., 
Hov1ever, on Nay 1, 191;-5, the OPA granted a price ad-
vance averaging $0.,16 a ton to help compensate for the $0.,21 
rise in labor costs per ton under the 1945 wage agreement., 
This meant that producers had to absorb $0.,05 or almost 
24% of the total rise in costs., The rise in costs and a?% 
decline in output reduced first half earnings of bituminous 
operators, whereas industrial earnings as a whole advanced, 
according to the 1946 edition of Standard & Poor's., 
To offer a hand to the depressed industry, on August 3, 
the Office of Economic Stabilization made a standard estab-
lishing operating margins at $0.,15 a ton or 1942 levels, 
(whichever was greater)., A further price increase 
averaging ~!;0.,031..'-7 a ton was granted in 13 of the country's 
22 producing districts.. Although volume continued to 
contract because of the prolonged fall strike., this action 
Q 
aided margins of most producers in the second half., In 
addition, interest charges were cut through debt reduction., 
Exceptions to the general decline in 1945 earnings were pro-
25., uBituminous Coal Industry Surveyu January 1, 191..'-6, Vol .. 
13 No., 1, pp., C-15 .. 
ducers which raised output or derived operating economies 
through extension of mechanization or the opening of new, 
lov1-cost mines .. 
18 The near-term outlook for bituminous operators appears 
a little more favorable, since recent price advances and 
prospective gains in tonnage should fully compensate for 
higher labor costs, and raise operating income.. Margins 
also will be aided by further mechanization of operations .. 
The removal of excess profits taxes should extend earnings 
gains., 
"The long term outlook, however, is unfavorable., The 
sharply lower demand appears inevitable over the longer term, 
despite efforts to retain war-boomed markets., In view of 
the excessive productive capacity of the bituminous mines, 
a period of severe competition is likely within the indus-
try., 1-:foreover, renewal of competition from alternative 
fuels is also expected., Thus, barring re-enactment of price 
control legislation and government regulation of natural 
resources, a repetition of the chaotic conditions that 
harassed the industry during the years following World War 
I is entirely possible.,n 
With the unusually large problems facing the industry 
of bituminous coal, the well-nigh universal Wall Street 
opinion concerning the industry's stoclrs was "Sell .. u 
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Certainly such an opinion is understandable in the face of 
such gloomy prospectso But a depressed industry theorist 
feels that in such a situation as the bituminous coal 
industry, there is a possibility of making money on the 
stocks, if the buying price of the stock is lo'tv enough. 
Consequently, when everyone was trying to sell their 
bituminous coal stocks, the stocksB prices were very 
quickly forced down until eventually some of the stocks of 
firms which were in a relatively strong position were actu-
ally underpriced. These underpriced stocks of strong firms 
within a depressed industry are the special "meat31 of de-
pressed industry theorists, so, in 1946, an investor fol-
lowing the depressed industry theory might well have chosen 
Island Creek Coal--one of the most outstanding bituminous 
coal firms--to put some investment funds into. 
Looking briefly at the description of Island Creek 
Coal which is given in the 1946 edition of "Standard & 
Poor's" we find this opinion proferred first about the 
industry and then about Island Creek Coal in particularo 
11 ~10 ST STOCKS UNATTRACTIVE FOR LONG TERM IN BITillUNOUS 
'. 
COAL INDUSTR~8 o Coal shares, which registered wider war-
time gains than the general market because of earnings 
improvement, decline proportionately more than the general 
market after mid-1945 on apprehension over the favorable 
long term outlook for the industryo The strongest finan-
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cially of the bituminous coal firms were considered to be 
Island Creek Coal, and Pond Creek Pochantasm 
Island Creek Coal had a smaller output and higher costs 
which practically offset the sharply lowered tax provisions 
in the first nine months of 1945. Nevertheless, production 
losses resulting from the October strikes were believed to 
have reduced earnings to $3 a common share for the year of 
1945. However, with the 1946 outlook a little more favor-
able, (because of the lower taxes, mainly) maintenance of 
the ~;oil4o quarterly dividend was expected e 
Under a lease contract with Columbian Carbon, the 
company retains a two-thirds interest in any gas produced 
on its West Virginia properties~~ ~fuile no gas has yet been 
sold because of lack of transportation facilities, this 
venture is expected to prove profitable~~ 
Despite dependence on general business conditions, 
then, the company had relatively low operating costs which 
permitted sustained earning power even in periods of reduced 
consumption or in periods of production stoppages caused by 
strikes~~ With these advantages in Island Creek's favor, the 
depressed industry theorist could well afford to invest in 
the common stock which was selling at a relatively low posi-
tion in the stock market, despite its dependable earning 
pov1er .. 
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From the descriptions presented by the \IJ'all Street 
publications concerning the coal and gasoline industries, 
it seems that in 1946 as well as in 1937, the depressed 
industry theorist is taking an opposite view from the 
security analysts of Wall Streets 
The third depressed industry stock of 1946 is also not 
an attractive stock in Wall Street's eyese .1'\lthough 11 iVIoody 1 s" 
also gave up commenting on this industry, an adequate 
description of the industry's problems may be found in the 
February 191+6 issue of the 11 Standard and Poor's Non-Ferrous 
Metal Industry Report.," 
essupplies of metais, including metal reserve holdings, 
are generally ample for current and expected requirements, 
but lead, tin, dadmium, and antimony are exceptionse 
noomestic production of the base metals 1r1ill expand 
in 19Lt-6 as mine, smelter, and refinery crews increase, 
although strikes will probably keep near-term out-put 
under the depressed 1945 levelse 
nsurplus metal sales will continue to be controlled 
over coming months, although it is clear that the War 
Assets Corporation (RFC subsidiary) which has taken over 
sales from the Surplus Property Administration, will make 
available as much metal from government owned surpluses 
as may be needed by industrye 11 
From this initial glance into the non-ferrous metal 
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industry, it 'ltJould appear that VIall Street irmuld be inclined 
to favor investment into the industry, but in 1946, \'iall 
Street was extremely wary of anything which wasn 1 t out-
standingly attractive (in the opinions of the security 
experts) and the impending labor trouble which was every-
where one looked in the metal industry in 1946 cast quite 
a shadow on the investment-advisability of the non-ferrous 
metal industry, as far as Wall Street was concernede 
The labor grievances, strikes, and misunderstandings 
were unusually prolific in the non-ferrous metal industry, 
and in the industries directly affecting the non-ferrous 
metal industrye Thus far, 1946 is the all time high year 
for number of man hours lost due to labor-management 
disputese So, because of the inevitable loss of earnings 
due to work stoppages, mainly, and because also of shrinking 
foreign markets and threatened surplusses, the publications 
of Wall Street saw fit to sell or recommend sale of the 
non-ferrous metal stockse 
The non-ferrous metal industry did have some redeem-
able points, however, which must be discussed to explain 
why the depressed industry theorist would find the stock 
attractive in the 19~-6 bull markets 
One of the first of these redeemable point was the fact 
that the Senate passed and sent to the House a new stock-
piling measure early in 1946, that would permit purchases, 
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within the quantities recommended by the Army-Navy Munition 
Board, not only from domestic output, but also from foreign 
sources when in the public interests Pu.rchases of domestic 
market metals were to be made at open market prices, but 
foreign market metals would be bought in without duty, and 
when disposed of could not be sold under domestic levels. 
Enactment of this measure did not remove the potential 
threat of surplusses and foreign metals from the market, 
since the terms of sales from the stockpile and declared 
surplusses under the new bill were not specific as to time 
and tonnages, and foreign metal could be purchased; 
whereas the Stockpile Act which was in effect before the 
new law limited the buying of metals to domestic sources® 
However, the important factor in this new act was that the 
stockpiling of metals was going to continue, so that the 
demand of non-ferrous metals was not going to slacken 
nearly so quickly as all the Wall Street publications had 
feared® 
In 1946's edition of Standard and Poor's there is a 
brief summary of the American Metal Company, Ltds In that 
volume we find that operating income rose 2s2% in the first 
nine months of 1945, but a 27% drop in dividend income and 
higher tax contingency reserves reduced net to ~?0 .. 94 a. 
common shares As this pattern probably continued in the 
final quarter of 191.(·5, the full year net was expected to 
approximate $1 .. 25 to $1s40, a shares Profits were considered 
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unlikely to rise much over coming months, as higher Mexi-
can taxes and wages were believed to absorb most of the ~~0.26 
price advance on silver made in September, 1945. Though the 
dividend was not expected to go up, it was expected to 
continue at $0.25 per quarter. 
The American Metal Company, Ltd. had an unusually good 
scrap utilization program--which in Wall Street's eyes, 
even--was a redeemable factor. Other outstanding qualities 
of the firm were its large holdings both in low cost for-
eign copper, and in lead and silver mines. 
Because this company was financially strong, diversi-
fied, and had an unusually good record for a long period 
of years, the fact that the firmws industry was suffering 
temporary troubles was no deterrent to the depressed 
industry theorist. The depressed industry theorist in 1946 
\liould have attem1::>ted to look beyond the then contemporary 
labor troubles and thereby determJne the company's possi-
bilities for the future. Because of the company 11 s in-
herent advantages over other firms within the industry, 
plus the long-term outlook for the whole industry, the 
depressed industry theorist would have undoubtedly passed 
up the securities of Pepsi Cola or Hontgomery t·lards in 1946 
and vmuld have bought instead the lmvly securities of 
American Metal Company, Ltd. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Up to this point in "The Critique of the Depressed 
Industry11 the stocks from both groups have been described 
as objectively and fairly as possible@ However, this final 
chapter will attempt to evaluate the two methods of buying 
stocks--indeed, if this chapter were titled it might be 
called "The 'ltlall Street Approach versus the Depressed 
Industry Approach@" 
To show quick comparisons between all the stocks 
mentioned in this paper, a series of figures have been set 
up showing the annual dividends and price appreciation of 
each stock over the period of years studied@ 
· Figures or statistics in and of themselves prove nothing 
--but they do describe a situation, and thereby enable us 
to draw our own conclusions@ The first set of figures con-
cerns the quality stocks bought in 1937--the stocks of 
Bethlehem Steel, Union Carbide and Carbon, and International 
Nickel@ Both the dividend and price range for the stocks 
are listed belowe The rule for gauging at what level the 
stocks 't<Jere bought is the follovling: All stocks \V'ill be 
bought at the highest price which the Wall Street publi-
cations recommended theme For example, if Company A'3 
.· 
stock were recommended to be bought by the Wall Street 
publications at 50, 53, and finally 60, 60 would be the 
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the price \vhich \'liould be called the nbuying-in" price o 26 
The selling price is determined by the simple procedure 
of selling all the stocks at their peak in 1946 and in 1952o 
· Bethlehem Steel was recommended as a good investment 
stock in 1937, by the Wall Street publications at the high 
price of 98 7/8 on August 9, 1937. The range and dividends 
for Bethlehem Steel are listed below: 
Bethlehem Steel (98 7/8) 
1946 
1945 
19lj-4 
1943 
1942 
1941 
191.:-0 
1939 
1938 
1937 
Dividends 
6.,00 
6 .. 00 
6o00 
6o00 
6o00 
6,.00 
5 .. oo 
lo50 
~ L,.7o50 
Price Range 
llll. - 85 
98 - 65 
67- 56 
69 - 5Lt. 
66 - 59 
89 - 51 
93 - 63 
100 - 50 
78 - 39 
105 - L.-1 
Union Carbide and Carbon was bought in at 103 1/8 from 
the 1937 bull market. This stock was recommended for invest-
ment purchase at 103 1/8 on May 3, 1937. 
Union Carbide and Carbon Dividends 
3 .. 00 
3 .. 00 
3o00 
3 .. 00 
3 .. 00 
3 .. 00 
2 .. 30 
lo90 
2 .. 40 
j_~Q 
2"8--:-80 
Price Range 
125 - 88 
102 - 78 
82 - 76 
86 - 76 
83 - 58 
79 - 60 
88 - 59 
94 - 65 
90- 57 
111 - 61 
26.. This "highest-recommended-price 11 appears to be more 
meaningful than an average, since an average stock price for 
such a year as 1937 is quite difficult to compute because of 
the wide market swing., 
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From these lists of figures taken from Bethlehem Steel 
and Union Carbide and Carbon, tvm facts are immediately 
apparent: first, that at the top of the 1946 bull market 
the stocks from these two companys were only slightly 
higher than the top of the 1937 market; second, these stocks 
took ten years to get back to the previous high levels at 
' \V'hich they \V'ere recommended for purchase by Wall Street in 
1937 .. 
International Nickel was recommended for purchase 
by the Wall Street publications on August 16, 1937, at 66l .. 
International Nickel 
1946 
1945 
194l~ 
19lt·3 
1942 
1941 
19),'-0 
1939 
1938 
1937 
Dividends 
1 .. 60 
1.,60 
1.,60 
2a00 
2a00 
2a00 
2a00 
2.,00 
2a00 
2a25' 
Price Range 
lt-2 - 28 
39 .... 28 
32 - 25 
36 - 25 
30 - 21.:-
31 - 23 
38 - 19 
55 - 35 
57 - 36 
73 - 37 
International Nickel's stock price dwindled rapidly 
after the high in 1937a By 1946 the stock was selling at 
its peak for about 6Q% of the price it was recommended for 
purchase at in 1937a 
Having established as clearly as possible the highest 
recommendations for our three "Blue Chipn stocks, 1r1e shall 
procede to do likewise with our three depressed industry 
stocks.. The only difference between the two stocks 'l.frill be 
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the type of recommendation given by ·vla.ll Street~ for the 
11 Blue Chips" the criteria vras "buy11 : for the depressed 
stocks, the recommendation vias n sell .. " At the point vrhere 
\\Tall Street first says "sell11 "lr!e shall buy in the depressed 
industry shares.. Admittedly, the stocks '\'lould be cheaper 
if we waited for a time before buying in the depressed 
stocks, but 'I!Je shall nevertheless buy in at the time of the 
fir$t n sell 11 recor.o.mendation in order to be as fair as 
possible .. 
Wall Street advised sale of the Bristol-l~ers 
secu~ities on August 31, 1937, when the stock was selling 
at 31 .. 
Bristol-1•1yers Dividends 
From these figures \ve can see 
2 .. 40 
2 .. 25 
2,00 
1.,90 
1 .. 90 
2 .. 55 
2 .. 55 
2.,>+0 
2 .. 40 
2.,60 
2'2:95 
that the 
Price Range 
stock of 
70- 35 
36 - 35 
53 - l,LQ 
41.'- - 37 
)_~3 - 30 
t~l - 38 
53 - 38 
53 - 41 
43 - 28 
l.L7 - 28 
Bristo1-~~ers enjoyed more than a 100% price appreciation 
during the 10 years between the 1937 and 1946 bull markets., 
Pan American Airlines w stock '\vas discouraged as a 
potential investment quality stock all during 1937.. The 
stock sold around 19 most of the year, and will therefore 
be bought in at that price., 
Pan American Airlines 
1946 
1945 
194lt-
1943 
1942 
1940 
1940 
1939 
1938 
1937 
Dividends 
0,15 
.. 60 
.. 60 
.. 30 
.. 25 
.,lre09 
2 .. 90 
125' 
Price Range 
39 - ll.'-
23 - 12 
13 - 6 
8 ... 3 
4 - 2 
6 - 2 
11 - 4 
19 - 9 
19 - 11 
26 - 15 
Pan Americanvs stock went through relatively greater 
price fluctuations than did the other stocks from the 1937 
depressed industries, However, the stocJc did have a 100% 
capital app!'eciation during the 10 years from 1937 to 1946 .. 
Pepperell Manufacturingas Stock was not even considered 
by ntost Security Analysts from ~I all Street in 1937, until 
the end of the fourth quarter when earnings zoomed upward., 
Up until that time the stocks sold below 70 most of the 
time, \>lhich is the price at which we shall purchase, In 
December of 1937, the Wall Street publications frantically 
sent out UEXTRAS" advising quick purchase of the Pepperell 
stocks, since the company was enjoying tremendous earnings, 
Though the stock had sold at 70 or below for most of the 
year in 1937, at December's close the stock was selling at 
150! The Pepperell stock was not deemed worthy of invest-
ment by Wall Street when it was selling at 70.. But \~~en 
the price rapidly advanced upwards, Pepperell's stock \vas 
considered so good that it even warranted Wall Street 
·publications nEXTRAS!" 
Pepperell Manufacturing (70) Dividend 
1946 
1945 
194~-
1943 
191.~2 
1941 
1942 
1939 
1938 
1937 
2 .. 00 
10 .. 00 
10 .. 00 
11 .. 00 
B .. oo 
6 .. 00 
5 .. 00 
3 .. 00 
3 .. 00 
14 .. 00 
72 .. 00 
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Price Range 
63 - 40 
53 - 46 
158 125 
125 1otl-
101 81 
98 - 79 
91 - 53 
91.1- - 58 
86 ... 54 
151 - 58 
(J1fter 
5 for 1 
split) 
From the figures from all six of the stocks "Vle can 
compile the following results: 
]21ue Chi.12s: ]ouglJ.t At Sold At 
--
Bethlehem Steel 98 7/8 114 .. 00 
Union Carbide & Carbon 103 1/8 125 .. 00 
International Nickel 66 1/l:-
- 42,_0Q 
Amount spent 2680)25 281 .. 00 
Overall Percentage Gain: 40% Average 
Depressed Stocks: Bough!; .A:t Sold At 
--
Bristol £4yers 31 700)00 
Pan American Airlines 19 390)00 
Pepperell Manufacturing 70 3150)00* 
*After a five for one split in stocks 
i~mount Spent: 120 % of Overall Gain: 334% 
Dividends ~Ga,;iJ} 
47 .. 50 63% 
28 .. 80 49 .. 3% 
19 .. 05 -70)8% 
95 .. 35 
.l\.nnual Gain: 4% 
Dividends %.GAin 
220)95 1990)8% 
20)90 120 .. 5% 
72 .. 00 452 .. 8% 
Average Annual 
Gain: 33%0) 
The accompanying charts on the following two pages 
will show the stock movements graphically .. 
-~$'mEL 
steel PrOd. : 
.. 
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~~~-; ~ss.aJ~i~~·:: Bethlehem Steel's stock movements from 
'Coiooloil: 9'582'1142 • 00 par: 1941 t 1946 h h r1aca1 Year: _ Dec. n· o are s own on t e accom-
panying graph. The top arrow at the 
left shows the stock's high point in 
1937, while the bottom left-hand arrow 
shows the stock's low point between 
1937 and 1941. Bethlehem Steel was 
bought at 98 7/8 in 1937 and was sold 
· at· 114 in 1946. The stock took ten 
years to .go through its 1937 top. 
TB011SANDII OF 8B 
...... 11144 
...... -~-M 3.lll 3.J'7 ~-9~ 
1 li.IIO !t.OO 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.011 
International Nickel 
suffered a great de-
cline in its stock 
price from its 1937 
high. The stock was 
recommended for pur-
chase in 1937 at 66t. 
Unfortunately for the 
stocks' purchasers at 
this time, Interna-
tional Nickel's stock 
has never since 
broken this high 
price.. · 
-
f----
f----
!----'--
1841 
2.22 
• _2.~ 
-
·-
lUning 1\ smel tine; 
Fun<le<l Debt: None 
5bs. 7% Pfd: 276,261 • $100 par== 
sns. c-on: 14,578,169 • no par-
Fiscsl Year: Dec •. ill== 
.. ·. r-· __,..........__!--
TiiOIJSANDs OF BHAllllll·• t---
...... 1843 ...... ...... 
·-2.15 2.00_ 1.71 1.58 1;90 
2.00 2.00 1.60 1.60 1.80 
Union Carbide and Carbon was recommended 
in 1937 for purchase at 103 1/8. During 
the next ten years after this recommen-
dation, the stock broke through the 103 
price for one short interval in 1946. 
~High point between 1937-1941. 
~Low point between 1937-1941. 
The graphs on this 
page are taken from 
F .. w .. Stephens 
compilation of 
"Graphic Stocks" 
for July-August 
1952, Vol. 8 No. 4. 
---,.-- UNION CARBIDE ll< CARBON 
. Olft, Indllll. · GIIS 1---,--
THOUSANDS OF SHARES -: 
1041 1$4& 1 48 UM4 1848 1846 
1.51 1.11 1.22 1.24 1.36 2.03 
. MR 1.oo 1.00 1.oo ~.oo _ c...bQL_ 
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On this page are graphs illustra-
ting the movements of the stocks 
chosen from the depressed indus-
tries of 1937. 
' TRODSA I OF HAilES 
IIMI 1848 U044 1848 , ... 
Bristol-Myers was bought at 31 
to.~~ in 1937, and sold in 1946 at 
~;t~~3 70. During this time, there ~~ were only two short intervals 
when the stock dropped below 
the 1937 buying-price. 
1.'111 .• ?0 2.01 .• 84 .71 4 • 
.• :l'lft .95 .95 .• oo .at ..2, 
The graphs or 
this page ar 
taken from F.~~: ~1·-~ 
:1. Stephens ~ riiiino 
::!ompilation 
of nGraphic 
3tocks" for 
July-August 
1952, Vol .. 8 
No .. 4 .. 
~ ~ 1848 ...... ·- ...... 
Pepperell Manufacturing'J 
stock was bought in 193? 
at 70. The stock droppe• 
below this price three 
times in the next ten 
years, but in 1946 after 
a stock split of five 
for one, the new stock 
was sold for 63, making 
the original stock wortl 
$315. 
4.04 ;_Q4 3.95 3.85 4o74 }4,8! .... ~ll>mi!IJIP.Al\1 -~DW~ Awe'iOUVQ 
_l._ao 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 I _2,51 ~~ ..... ......, ......... ,~ 
The Pan American stock was 
bought in 1937 at 19.. The 
stock experienced wide fluc-
tuations throughout the next 
ten years, but in six of the 
ten years, the stock did 
break the 1937 buying price 
of 19. · It was sold in 1946 
for 39 .. 
~High point between '37-'41 
~ Low point between '37-' ,1 
~ 
.a? 
- ~ .50 
ID4D 
.49 •• .41 .23 • .§It .5o .25 ~
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From the figures \.rhich vJere taken from the "Blue Chips" 
chosen from the 19~-6 Bull Stoclr Market \'ie find that Pepsi 
Cola was bought in at 40e 
Pepsi Cola (40) 
1946 
1911-5 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
National Container 
1946 
19t.'-7 
1948 
19~'-9 
1950 
1951 
1952 
*Stock split three 
for one., 
Montgomery irlard 
1946 
19Lr5 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
From the comparisons 
1952 we see: 
was 
of 
Total % Loss 12t% 
Pepsi Cola (loss) 
Natvl Con .. IV 
l>iont. Vlo Gain 
Dividends 
.90 
.95 
.425 
.20 
2.475 
Securities were 
Price Range 
40- 21 
3~'-- 22 
25 - 7 
12 - 8 
12 - 7 
12 - 8 
12 - 9 
bought in at 42., 
42 - 13 
15 - 13 
9 - 5 
13 - 9 
11 - 6 
14 - 11 
14 - 11 
recommended at 75.5 in 1946. 
2.00 lOll· - 57 
3 .. 00 64 - tl-9 
3.,00 65 - 47 
3 .. 00 59- 47 
3<&00 67 - 1+9 
4oOO 75 - 64 2.00 75- 60 
these stocks figures from. 1946 to 
58 .. 8% 
Average Loss Overall 
- lo8% 
8 .. 4% 
37 .. 1% 5 .. 3% 
2 .. 6% .. 37% (Gain) 
The accompanying charts show the stock movements for 
the period between 1946 and 1952 .. 
MONTGOMERY 'IV ARD 
Mail Order 1!. Clain, 
stores 
THOUSANDS OF SHARES . 
~ed Debt: None 
Shs.$'7 Cl A: :¥l1,554 - !IO par 
Sb$. Co11111101t: 6,502,378 - no par . 
FiSCal Year: Jan.· 31 
10.28 7,13 11.1.9 8.14 
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The graphs on this 
page are taken from 
80 F.. W. Stephens com-
Stocks" for July-
80 August 1952, Vol. 8 
No .. 4 .. 
50 
Montgomery Ward was 
recommended for pur-
chase at 75! in 1946. 
Since that time, it 
has never broken 
through this level. 
t--"'lW.-1--~~-L...O!:o=...L..W""'-l~L.Lh.J&-L...3.M 3.00 3,00 4.00 "'· 
,...-:--- NATIONAL CONTAINER NCO 
stock was recommended 
for purchase in 1946 
at 42 •. The stock was 
split in 1948 three 
for one, so in 1946 . 
the new stock selling 
at 14 meant that the 
old stock had again 
risen to its 1Q~6 
1 AV~J. .. 
• 
:~~~t: ·s_,:ruw 
!:§i(~~; 5,752,005-~ ~ 
-TBOUII iNDII OF .,..._. 
~P~~tt:~r 
-· 111411 .... " lii44 111411 ·- .... 7 ...... "'" ..... • ..... 
:¥ll 
140. 
Pepsi Cola's stock 
I" was recommended for 
1~'purchase in 1946 at 
40. Since that time 
128 the stock has decline; 
l:ro to 9, and has never 
come close to the 
lxs high levels of 1946. 
lw 
5 
::-M .10 12 .02 .110 .011 .18 .55 .22 .46 kMo 
.II» .'15 .8» .110 .AS ~-.~ .:.¥) · • - fji; 
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The statistics for the depressed stocks chosen from 
the 1946 b ul1 market as shown previously are as follov.rs: 
American Metal Company Ltd. (27) 
1946 
19l-t·7 
1948 
1949 
195'0 
1951 
1952 (two for one split) 
Sinclair Oil (37) 
1946 
1947 
191;-8 
1911-9 
195'0 
1951 
1952 
Island Creek Coal (41) 
1946 
1947 * 
1948 
1949 
195'0 
1951 
1952 
*Two for· one stock split 
Dividends Price Range 
1.00 
2.25 
2.,00 
2.00 
2.,00 
3 .. 00 
2~00 
13 .. 2; 
1 .. 40 
L.6o 
1 .. 40 
1.,40 
1 .. 75 
1 .. 90 
.._L9J) 
11 .. 35 
l;-3 - 23 
32 - 25 
35 - 2l.'-
33 - 22 
1+7 - 29 
~4 - l.'-1 
64 - 51 
48 - 35' 
43 - 33 
33 - 23 
38 - 21..'-
46 - 35 
63 - 41 
63 - l.'-6 
50- 39 
69 - 38 
39 - 29 
32 - 2}.,, 
35' - 27 
39 - 32 
39- 27 
From these figures derived from the depressed industry 
stocks taken from the 1946 bull market we see: 
Total % Gain 139.5% Average Gain 19 .. 93% 
American Metal n 186.,1% 26.6 % 
Sinclair Oil n 100 .. 9% 14.,4% 
Island Creek Coal " 143 .. 5% 20.,5% 
Average J~ual Gain: 13.9% 
The following page shows these stock movements 
graphically., 
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-- SINCLAIR OIL 
The graphs on this 
1•u page are taken from 
F. W. Stephens cqm-
an Stocks" for July-Aug-
~ ust 1952, Vol .. 8 No .. L 
30 Sinclair Oil was 
bought on a depressed 20 industry basis in '4() 
1o at 37.. The stock 
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35 American Metal Co .. 's 
30 
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1946 at 27. By 
35 1952 the stock was 
selling at 63. The 
'
30 American Metal Co. 
Ito depressed in 1946 .. 
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Island Creek CoaJ 
·was bought in 194( · 
at 41.. In 1947 th 
shares were split 
two for one.. By 
1952 the original 
stock was selling 
for 78.. Island 
Creek Coal stock 
was a depressed 
-stock in the 1946 
bull market .. 
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Comparing the figures of the two groups of stocks from 
the 1937 bull market and the 1946 bull markets, one can see 
a large difference bet\veen the percentage gain on the t"t'io 
groups of stocks* 
Three top stocks--in Wall Street's opinion--were chosen 
from both marltets, and three of the unpopular, un"tvanted-by-
Wall-Street stocks were chosen from the same bull markets* 
'I'hese groups of stocks "tv-ere compared, and the results in 
figures have been presented aboves 
In summary, this paper wishes to point out that the 
adherents of the depressed industry theory believe the fol-
lowing: That the Wall Street publications tend to pick 
stocks that are doing and have done very well for sometime 
even though they have risen greatly in prices From this 
"t·.re can conclude that the security analysts of \·/all Street 
stress the short term prospect in their recommendations a 
great deal more than the long term prospects, though the 
Wall Street publications recommend the stocks for invest-
ment-long-term purposes* This accounts for the common Wall 
Street practice of advising purchase of a stock which has 
gone through a long upward trend and is still rising* 
Under such circumstances, Wall Street looks bac~.,rards 
and extrapolates the trend* Unfortunately, this practice 
often leads unwary investors into buying stocks at unusu-
ally high levelss Too often the investor then gets caught 
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on •5high ground n as the stoclt market recedes further and 
further from him. 
The supporters of the depressed industry theory '\ll'ould 
be the first to disclaim the theory's infallibility. Few 
economic phenomena are harder to predict than the future 
actions of the stock market. As Dr. Douglas Bellemore, of 
Boston University has often said in his lectures to 
investment classes, 11 Investing in the stock market is not 
a science •••• it is an art." 
Regardless of the opinion one holds for the evidence 
presented in this paper which upholds the workability of 
the depressed industry theory, this paper has striven to 
point out one thing which the adherents of either the 
Wall Street or Depressed Industry Theory will probably 
accept: Whether an investor is a strict observor of 
Wall Street recommendations or a depressed industry ad-
vocate; 't'ihether the investor has $10 or ~~10 million, 
every investor should find out for himself as nearly as 
possible what kind of an investment he is making. It 
should be common sense to anyone that it is impossible for 
everyone to make money simply by following the crowd's 
example in the ·stock market., 
As far as this paper is concerned, it would be a 
waste of time to point out the errors made by the Wall 
Street predicters. The publications• errors like any errors 
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are easy to see, now that they are viewed by hindsight, 
though a depressed industry theorist would have argued 
against the Wall Street opinions at the time of their origin. 
So, in conclusion, let us look at the hypothesis of 
this thesis which was stated in the introduction: 18 The 
Depressed Industry Theory is based on the quotation taken 
from Horace 1 s m Poetica, "Many shall be restored that nm·J 
are fallen, and many Shall fall that nm..r are in honor .. " 
I believe that the conclusions draw~ from the evidence 
presented herein afford convincing substantiation of the 
hypothesis of this thesis .. 
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